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# **West Europe Report**

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29 October 1984

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## DEBATE IN DANISH PEACE MOVEMENT REFLECTS EUROPEAN-WIDE RIFT

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 21 Sep 84 p 3

[Article by Jørgen Dragsdahl]

[Text] The conflict within the Danish peace movement reflects a general rift within the West European peace movement where bloc policy has been put on the agenda.

Will the peace movements have to settle with the legacy of the Yalta Treaty, where the victors of World War II, in reality, divided Europe into two opposing blocs, each subject to its superpower? Are peace activists in the West to support those similarly disposed in the East when they get into conflict with the authorities? Is there a difference between nuclear armament in the West and the East?

These are some of the questions which have given rise to an increased ideological debate within the Danish peace movement. The debate reflects a rift in the entire West European peace movement where the distinction between two main currents has become clearer after the focus on the missile build-up of the West, which used to unite the peace movement, has been abandoned by many.

Political values which are also employed in the debate among the blocs, constitute a central issue in the debate, and that is why a showdown within the peace movement may readily become a part of the new cold war. Peace policy groups in both Eastern and Western Europe, therefore, have sought a dialogue through a number of meetings arranged by the Greek peace movement KEADEA.

In a report to the Danish organization No to Nuclear Weapons, Rex Schade and Judith Winther sum up the situation as follows:

"The situation is almost classical. The peace committees, whether they represent an East European country or are located in one of the West European countries, take the apparently simple and clear position: Let us cooperate on the thing on which we agree, viz. the opposition to the provocative build-up of the United States and NATO. The nuclear threat is so serious, they state, that we have no time nor can we afford any form of rift or disagreement. We should not start an extensive debate on the build-up of the East since it is merely a legitimate reaction to the build-up of the West."

"In reply to this, the independent peace movements state that build-up is the result of mutual influence, where neither of the superpowers can escape its share of the responsibility. In view of the existing overkill capacity, there is no excuse for any newly acquired weapon--each new weapon merely serves to further the arms race. It is the very theory of a deterrent and the completely senseless demand for arms balance in a overarmed world which will have to be changed. Merely talking about the thing on which we agree, viz. the opposition to the build-up of the West, therefore, reflects an actual recognition of the justification of the build-up of the Soviet Union and the entire arms race."

So far, an arrangement has been made for representatives of the peace movements of a number of countries to work out an outline for a debate on the political situation in Europe, steps toward the creation of a nuclear-free Europe as well as measures to establish confidence and security. These matters will be brought up at a meeting in Athens during the days 10-12 December with 120 participants from 28 countries.

#### END Appeal

A number of statements of principle which have been issued in the course of the year by organizations which have been active in the missile protests of recent years, show how much the distance has grown to those who put the highest priority on "the struggle against nuclear weapons."

The change appears most clearly when comparing the END appeal "A nuclear-arms-free Europe as of 1980" with a proposal for a European peace resolution introduced in the debate by the British END committee (END stands for European Nuclear Disarmament). In both cases, the chief author is the British historian E.P. Thompson.

The appeal of 1980, which was signed by organizations and prominent individuals both in the East and the West, is today referred to by many as obsolete. It was written at a time when U.S. intermediate-range missiles had not yet been deployed in Europe. Even more important, however, is the fact that the appeal was a product of the first stage of the struggle against nuclear arms.

The major part of the text focused upon the need for nuclear disarmament--the goal was a nuclear-free Europe from Poland to Portugal. A broader perspective, however, was indicated: "We shall have to start acting in a way as if a united and peaceful Europe already existed. We have got to learn to be loyal, not toward the East or the West, but toward one another, and we have to disregard the prohibitions and limitations imposed upon us by national states."

In the new text, this perspective has become expanded to such an extent that the threat against Europe is no longer primarily sought in nuclear armament. It says: "The division of our continent into two hostile political military blocs is in itself a major reason for our common uncertainty."

There is opposition to conventional armament. The most likely thing, the new text says, is that even if some people will argue that more modern conventional weapons may reduce the need for nuclear weapons, armament will take place in both fields.

## Cause of Nations

There will be no real security in Europe until the dominance of the superpowers has come to an end, the British END committee states. "However, we no longer believe that the governments of NATO or the Warsaw Treaty have the power or the will to put an end to it. Nor can we wait for limited measures involving 'armament control' to be negotiated between the superpowers without our participation."

That is why the peoples will have to take the matter into their own hands and establish contacts with a view to furthering common goals:

Any form of demilitarization;

Free communication among the peoples of both parts of Europe;

The withdrawal of all foreign soldiers and bases from the territory of European nations.

The year 2000 is the "latest possible date" for withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet forces.

Even if one supports all steps toward demilitarization, "this is no goal in itself," it says. "They must be steps which bring an end to the division of Europe and the confrontation between blocs."

The opposition to persecution of peace activists and attempts at limiting the access of the public to information is stronger than before. The global perspective--arms trade, exploitation of the Third World, peace movements outside Europe--has also been included.

Similar ideas recur in a number of other statements.

## Yalta Logic

On 25 March, the Italian peace movement adopted a resolution of principles which was divided into four main items. In a discussion of the danger of war, the "Yalta logic" is opposed because "we find that no nation must be regarded as hostile, and because we find that every nation must benefit from the same rights, and because the right to peace and security for every man and woman is based on confidence and cooperation among nations."

"Peace is also democracy and freedom," it says in the introduction to another main item, which argues that military logic reduces a human being to a tool for death. Militarization questions the sovereignty of nations and limits the freedom of all people. Only a free society can banish the danger of war.

"War does not result from nothing but is caused by deep injustice, which has divided the world into a few privileged and desperate masses," it says in the

third item which takes up the unequal access to resources and the problem of hunger. The unrestricted consumption of natural resources is also opposed.

The fourth item argues for a self-governing and alliance-free peace movement. The peace movement is a meeting place for people of different culture, history, motivation and ideology. That is why international cooperation is needed and "we shall reinforce our contacts to those in Eastern Europe who are fighting for disarmament and deployment of nuclear weapons in their countries by opposing the idea of blocs."

In a joint resolution which, at the END conference in Perguia last July, was supported by peace activists and organizations in various countries (among others by the Polish group KOR opposing the system), the Yalta Treaty is attacked directly: "The so-called Yalta Treaty, which, according to some, sacrificed a bit of freedom in order to guarantee security in return, actually has suppressed freedom and threatened our security."

Yalta has brought about armament and provided cover for dictatorships and invasions. "However, today the Yalta Treaty is dead," it says. The reason is that nobody can any longer be asked to give up their freedom struggle with reference to the international balance of power.

A free and peaceful Europe may only arise "from below," i.e. through a dialogue among men and women on both sides of the wall which "divides our continent."

"We want to talk to one another as Europeans who after 40 years of division forced upon us from the outside have decided that we want to examine our societies beyond the borders, not only because of intellectual curiosity, but first and foremost in order to understand each individual partner's language and fate as well as to build a Europe with free, sovereign, peaceful peoples on a solid and permanent basis."

Peace and freedom cannot be separated, the joint resolution goes on to say. Political pluralism and free social debate are necessary in order for the international tension to become reduced, a disarmament process to be started and the bloc division to be abandoned.

The clear, broad political aim does not mean, however, that the arms race is being entirely ignored. The signatories state that, in their countries, they will oppose the deployment and production of nuclear weapons and other "aggressive weapons." The establishment of nuclear-free zones is supported.

#### Human Rights

Some observers see the division in the peace movement between those who focus on weapons systems in order to create a broad unity through the exclusion of other political aspects, and those who, as stated above, include the bloc system and constitutional rights.

However, the respect for human rights has become such an indispensable demand that it has even been included in joint resolutions which otherwise quite clearly are turned against the most recent inventions of the weapons industry.

The majority within the West German peace movement, for example, has issued a draft END appeal which focuses almost exclusively on weapons. The growing danger of war is ascribed to the deployment of new missiles in the East and the West, the U.S. space war program, the new conventional, ostensibly more offensive strategy of NATO, the policy and use of power of the West in the Third World, cuts in social grants to release funds for military purposes, arms trade, and the general militarization of the nations of the world.

However, even the above-mentioned statement advocates recognition of the fact that the right of self-determination of peoples and "the respect of collective and individual human rights--independent of social systems, geographic location or alliances--form an integral part of the coexistence of peoples."

#### Cold War

The Soviet side originally reacted with sharp charges against END in particular, when that group made its positions known. It was ostensibly a question of psychological warfare against the peace movement, the work of the CIA, etc. Similar charges have not been made equally forcefully this year.

However, the alliance-free peace movement has taken up issues which form part of the arsenals of some of the leading cold war advocates. On 17 August, President Reagan made a speech in which he stated that the United States rejects any interpretation of the Yalta Treaty "indicating American approval of Europe's division into spheres of influence." And on 20 August, Secretary of State Schultz stated that "we will never accept the idea of a divided Europe."

Leading American advocates of armaments control and relaxation have charged the Reagan administration with a resumption of the policy of the fifties which aimed at a removal of the Iron Curtain. In these circles which were behind the endeavor at detente of the seventies, the feeling is that disarmament and more general political demands should not be confused. The West European peace movement is on its way away from that position but, ironically though it may be, is thus moving closer to the Reagan administration.

Those who criticize the armament, militarism and suppression of independent peace activity of the East are constantly being charged with playing into the hands of cold warmongers, or of at least risking that they may be conceived as such in power centers of the East. In reply to this charge, No to Nuclear Weapons states in a recent pamphlet: "Does the East not understand the criticism of their armament and our demand that they, too, undertake independent disarmament steps, have they not understood our criticism of the armament of the West but simply used it to justify their own armament and to strengthen their own negotiating position."

In order for deep splits and confrontation to be prevented, it is one of the major future tasks to carry through this argumentation so that it will be understood in the East and in the more East-oriented parts of the Western peace movement.

## DEFENSE MINISTER REAFFIRMS NUCLEAR ARMS POLICY

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 23 Sep 84 p 9

[Article by Michael Ehrenreich]

[Text] Denmark bases its security on solidarity with the rest of the members of the NATO alliance, but that involves obvious obligations which Denmark cannot escape, Defense Minister Hans Engell states.

Sudden or unilateral departures from Denmark's hitherto nuclear arms policy will neither contribute to, nor improve, our own security, nor will it make the world a more peaceful place. On the contrary, it will be tantamount to gambling with very serious problems, Defense Minister Hans Engell states.

"We have to face it quite clearly that Danish actions--in serious conflict with the NATO strategy of today--are bound to create major problems in conjunction with our participation in the integrated military cooperation within the alliance. It is also difficult to comprehend that unilateral and independent action on the part of Denmark might, in any way, reduce the danger of nuclear war," Hans Engell said yesterday at a conference at the Rolighed training center at Skodsborg, outside of Copenhagen.

The minister of defense did not mention the Social Democratic Party by name, but it was obvious that his statements were aimed at the increased opposition to NATO embodied in the security policy program which was adopted at the SDP party congress earlier in the week.

"The NATO alliance is based on the solidarity and mutual trust of its members. However, the solidarity of our allies on which we base our security also gives us obvious obligations which we cannot escape. Any attempts to disengage ourselves from our NATO membership will be tantamount to reducing the level of security of Denmark," Hans Engell said.

The defense minister stressed the reservations on the part of successive Danish governments since 1957 with respect to deployment of nuclear armed forces on Danish territory, and Hans Engell pointed to the possibilities of the alliance of having at its disposal a flexible range of possibilities of reaction to a nuclear attack, if any.

"As stated in 1965 by the then minister of defense, Victor Gram, Denmark's defense is in the final analysis dependent upon the nuclear deterrent force of the West. It was against this background that we joined the NATO nuclear planning group in 1966, and, through that group, we have had access to information and have been able to participate in discussions on strategic thinking which is an important prerequisite of exerting influence on NATO's concrete defense plans," Hans Engell said.

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## PROBLEMS OF SPANISH ENTRY INTO EEC DISCUSSED

Paris LE FIGARO in French 29-30 Sep 84 p 4

[Article by Gerard Druesne, dean of the School of Law and Economics of Nancy]

[Text] It can be clearly seen in the difficulties the Ten are experiencing in working out a joint position: Spain's membership rouses much more concern within the Community because it exacerbates antagonisms between North and South countries and it is mainly in the field of agriculture that the conflicts of interest are sharpening. In the field of industry, in fact, the conditions of competition should not basically change on the Community market, which is already quite wide open to Spanish products since the 1970 trade agreement granting Spain important tariff concessions.

Inversely, the dismantling of the highly protectionist customs and fiscal system set up in that country will help exporters in industrialized countries and it is certain that Germany or the Benelux countries have great interest in the expansion, while Spanish industry, used to a protected milieu, is rather apprehensive about the effects of free trade. A change in strategy will undoubtedly be necessary for enterprises that have made direct investments in Spain for several years and whose policy, based on the attraction of protectionism and low wages, will have less *raison d'être*.

## Agriculture

In the field of agriculture, the facts are infinitely more complex because in Spain, agriculture has a much more important place than in the Community, even if it has declined greatly since 1960. It thus accounts for 7.4 percent of the gross national product (3.9 percent in the EEC) and employs 18.3 percent of the active population (EEC average: 7.7 percent). The Brussels Commission calculated that Spain's membership will increase the agricultural area utilized by 30 percent and the number of farms by 32 percent, but that of consumers by only 14 percent.

Mediterranean production is obviously at the heart of the debate. Production of olive oil, already up sharply since the entry of Greece, will rise by 59 percent and the surpluses that will result will limit access to the Community market for countries such as Tunisia- Morocco or Turkey, linked to the EEC by

agreements of cooperation or association. The situation is particularly serious for Tunisia, 78 percent of whose olive oil exports go to the EEC and make up half of its agricultural exports.

The rate of self-supplying of the EEC will also go up with respect to fruits and vegetables, whose production has so far been concentrated in Italy, southern France and Greece. Its vegetable harvest places Spain in second place behind Italy and its production of citrus fruit has a considerable surplus (235 percent).

#### Rise in Yields

Surpluses are not as high for other fruits (105 percent for peaches, 108 percent for apricots, 101 percent for pears), but favorable climatic conditions make harvests earlier than in the rest of Europe and facilitate marketing. Above all, Spanish agriculture has a potential for expansion thanks to the possible increase in yield and the development of irrigation, whose importance it is difficult to measure inasmuch as an additional incentive to produce cannot fail to result from higher prices and the application to fruits and vegetables of Community support mechanisms on markets from which they had not previously benefited.

For wine, we know that Spanish vineyards lead the world in area (1.7 million hectares), even if one should attenuate resulting fears by recalling that because of low yield, production (39 million hectoliters) accounts for only one-quarter of that of the EEC. The fact nevertheless remains that there is a risk of an increase in surpluses, especially of white wine, and that it results in a serious disagreement between France and Italy on measures to take.

#### Fishing Fleet

Finally, fishing is a particularly delicate, even explosive, issue, if one is to judge by the serious incidents of recent months between the French navy and Basque trawlers. With 17,000 ships and 110,000 fishermen, the tonnage of the Spanish fleet represents 70 percent of that of the EEC (without Greece), but the fishing zones open to it are inadequate, especially because member nations expanded their exclusive fishing zone to 200 miles in 1976, meaning that Spain has a deficiency in this sector. Spain is therefore a formidable competitor demanding access to EEC resources, especially in the Gulf of Gascogne, one that will force the Community to somehow pay for the many fishing agreements it concluded with third countries at a high cost in order to make up for the inadequacy of its national resources. All these difficulties must be overcome because a political commitment has been made to Spain concerning membership as well as the schedule, and one must now imagine mechanisms capable of preventing any worsening of the imbalances. But the task is all the more difficult because it is not merely a matter of negotiating with the Spanish delegation. It is within itself that the Community must seek an agreement.

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## RESULTS OF EEC, CONTADORA GROUP MEETING ANALYZED

Paris LE FIGARO in French 1 Oct 84 p 3

[Article by Irene Jarry]

[Text] Only a few days away from the UN Security Council debate on Nicaragua, the EEC, Spain and Portugal have tried to give another boost to the efforts of the Contadora group (Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela) by recognizing "the revised draft of the Contadora Act" aiming to put an end to conflict in the region as a "fundamental stage in the peace process in Central America."

For his part, emphasizing that "this document goes very far in the integration of and the search for cooperation between the countries involved," French Minister of Foreign Relations Claude Cheysson stated that he was "very impressed" with the general approval given to the Contadora process by his colleagues from the 21 European and Central American countries that participated in the meeting in San Jose, Costa Rica, on Friday and Saturday.

Approval of the Contadora document is, however, far from enough to settle all problems. Just because all the Central American nations, led by Nicaragua, are stating their desire for peace loud and clear and because Europe has joined in this profession of faith does not mean that the conflicts will cease tomorrow! The Contadora document asks for a halt in the arms race, the departure of foreign military advisers and the democratization of political regimes.

However, one can see that Nicaragua, the most militarized country in the region, continues to receive Soviet materiel and continues its arms trafficking through the Gulf of Fonseca going to the Salvadoran guerrillas. Furthermore, even if Nicaragua is organizing elections for 4 November, it is much more for the purpose of institutionalizing the Marxist regime in power than in order to move toward democratization. Finally, with respect to the foreign advisers, one can see that reference is constantly made to the American presence, while cautious silence is observed with respect to the number and exact functions of the Cuban "doctors" and "teachers" -- officially, all civilian technical advisers -- in the region.

In a confidential letter which newsmen obtained thanks to a leak Friday night, American Secretary of State George Shultz also urged ministers of foreign affairs meeting in San Jose to provide no political, economic or military aid to Nicaragua. "I hope," he writes, "that the Ten will not miss any opportunity

to encourage the Sandinists to reconsider their current line and that you will work to urge the Sandinists to open up their political system."

#### Awkward American Intervention

This awkward but understandable intervention by a country that supports Central America financially and that sees Marxism gaining a foothold close to its borders in an area it has always considered as its back yard, was not appreciated by participants in the San Jose meeting, who viewed it as an attempt to meddle in their debate.

For his part, Cheysson refused to comment on Shultz' letter, but when questioned about what President Reagan might think of the San Jose meeting, our minister of foreign relations answered: "What does Mr Reagan have to do with it? As far as I know, he is not a member of the EEC or of the Central American group or of the Contadora group." Actually, this was perhaps just a coy response, for one may recall that in July 1983, Cheysson did not at like the idea of President Reagan making offers of aid to Chad, thus getting involved in problems in France's back yard!

On the economic level, the Ten are far from responding to the expectations of Central America. While the latter has to face a debt of \$6 billion, European commitments do not exceed 60 million ecus (some \$48 million) for 1984, meaning an increase of \$18 million over 1983. This sum should be distributed through the Bank of Central America for Economic Integration, which would grant credits for development projects in the region, each loan to be approved by the EEC Executive Commission in Brussels. Priority is to be granted to research projects on health, development and agriculture and aid to the thousands of refugees in the region.

It should be noted, with respect to economics, that the text of the final communique remains very vague. Regarding commercial trade, the 21 deemed that "the system of general preferences may constitute an adequate instrument for encouraging expansion of foreign trade and the industrialization of those countries." Concerning investments, the ministers confined themselves with noting that "the promotion and protection of European investments in Central America were of mutual interest," all this with no further details. Finally, one will note that other meetings are planned, either at the ministerial level or on the level of other government officials, but at a speed to be determined "based on the circumstances."

In other words, the record is not apt to rouse enthusiasm: no set schedule for the coming meetings; approval of a very interesting peace plan but one that is difficult to apply; no financial commitments from Europe.

As one high European official stated in San Jose, the meeting of the 21 might have been only a "flare that shed light on a situation and then went out."

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CSO: 3519/5

## LE PEN PHENOMENON ON EUROPEAN LEVEL ANALYZED

Paris LE FIGARO in French 1 Oct 84 p 6

[Article by Pierre Pellissier]

[Text] It took only a few weeks for the "Le Pen effect," first revealed by the 17 June European elections, to take on international dimensions. It is a phenomenon created by a similarity of economic, social or moral problems, but also by the difficulties linked with immigration and terrorism within the Community of the Ten. The outbreak of violence seen Friday evening in the Brussels suburbs shows that this Le Pen effect creates both feelings of interest and strong winds of rejection.

The attitude is, in fact, nothing new. Substantially complicating the tactic of the opposition in France itself, the penetration of the National Front is received ambiguously by the majority and in a hostile manner in other circles. The same is true in Strasbourg, where Jean-Marie Le Pen observed it in the first meetings of the European Parliament when, on 25 July, some elected officials tried to prevent him from speaking.

Seen from abroad, this resurgence of a certain right is sometimes poorly received. In Brussels, it has just been observed, but in Athens as well, where its imminent presence is rejected. Le Pen's response is simple: If the European Parliament requires elected officials from at least two nations to form a group, it thereby recognizes a Community dimension of that political group.

Furthermore, Jean-Marie Le Pen is surrounded by not only the other nine elected officials from France, but also five Italians and one Greek. Under such conditions, the group will have in the weeks ahead working meetings in Italy and Greece, Rome being scheduled for November and Athens for December, without any question of going, without the consent of authorities, to visit the former rebel colonels, as had been claimed. Even if, on this occasion, Le Pen is astonished that the defenders of human rights mobilize so easily for leftist prisoners and so rarely for their rightist colleagues!

The recent incidents therefore pose the problem of the European parliamentary representation.

It is certain that the smaller groups -- of which Le Pen's is one -- must work harder than others to be heard and manifest themselves more just to exist. This has been and remains true of all little groups playing the voting game. The ecologists were the first example.

This explains why Jean-Marie Le Pen does not intend to give up any invitation, any visit. It also explains why the National Front is -- almost by itself among the opposition groups -- fiercely supportive of proportional voting, which is the only way it can have elected officials.

It remains to be seen why the left and the far left, which always claim to act in the name of democracy, sometimes try to prevent him from speaking and therefore, cause him to be talked about.

#### Other Arguments

Until the evening of 12 June, there was one semblance of an explanation: Any vote won by Le Pen was theoretically lost for the RPR and the UDF. Furthermore, it was so easy to make an amalgam between the right and the extreme right. The result certainly went beyond the hopes of the left: The National Front was doing better than the PC!

Since that time, the phenomenon has grown more complex, but it undoubtedly derives from the same principle. The left, with the PS dropping to 20 percent and the PC below 10 percent, can now hope -- in order to limit the damage -- only that opposition votes will be splintered. As we have seen at the UDF summer university, the majority managed on this precise point to give the opposition a bad conscience. In the RPR, things are neither simpler nor easier.

Le Pen, who believes in the existence of a trend in his favor, wants to exist. And, paradoxically enough, the left is not unhappy that he does exist, even if, as everything proves, he also takes votes away from the PC and the PS. Whence that manner of carrying him to center front, by aggression, if need be.

However, it is not sure that democracy has anything to win at the game the left seems to be playing. There are other arguments to pit against a politician than striking arguments.

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CSO: 3519/5

## U.S. POLL SHOWS BELGIANS OPPOSE EUROMISSILES

Burssels LE SOIR in French 20 Sep 84 pp 1, 2

[Article by Jean-Paul Marthoz: "Confidential U.S. Poll: Belgians Say No to Missiles and to Russians"]

[Text] Whereas the West German pacifist movement, on the occasion of the large scale autumn NATO maneuvers, is stirring again (a 210 km long human chain is planned for this 20 October between Hasselbach and Duisbourg), all seems calm on the Belgian front where the CNAPD [National Action Committee for Peace and Development] and the VAKA [Flemish Action Committee Against Nuclear Weapons], the two main pacifist organizations, are reserving their strength for autumn 1985.

Antimissile sentiment, however tested again at the time of the Florennes demonstration last 29 April, shows little effect of the passing of the seasons. According to a confidential inquiry carried out in Belgium by United States information services, 6 Belgians out of 10 are basically hostile to the installation of Eurostrategic rockets on our territory and in Europe.

In a very sobering memorandum, the author who analyzed the results of this inquiry carried out at the end of May noted that "opposition to Euromissiles remains practically unchanged since the beginning of deployment in Western Europe." This consistency of public opinion is also one of the main conclusions of the poll taken this summer by the Flemish weekly PANORAMA according to which 76 percent of Belgians still say they are opposed to Euromissiles as against 79 percent a year ago.

While the "yes" to Euromissiles was offered by the heads of government of the five countries concerned (FRG, Italy, Great Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands) as security for necessary firmness against the Soviet Union, the majority of Beogian public opinion sees no contradiction between saying "no" to the missiles and saying "no" to the Soviet Union.

The poll, taken in the context of an American inquiry into European attitudes in the area of security, clearly establishes that Belgians have no illusions concerning the Kremlin's peace policy. In the view of 55 percent of the people questioned, the risk of war comes above all

from Moscow, even if only a third of public opinion is afraid of a Soviet attack within 5 years. An overwhelming majority of the public (67 percent) even thinks that blind confidence should not be placed in the USSR's respect for possible agreements on arms limitations.

But even if the Soviet threat is clearly seen, how is one to explain that the "inconvenience" caused by the Euromissiles is considered more serious than the risks they are supposed to counteract?

The answers appear to be simple enough: the Belgians seem to be convinced that the world's nuclear arsenal is already quite sufficient and that the deployment of Euromissiles only intensifies the arms race between the two superpowers. From Moscow's point of view, the SS-20's were a response to NATO's advanced systems, and the British and French strike forces; the Pershing 2s and cruise missiles, according to NATO, were to checkmate the SS-20's; the installation of SS-21's and SS-22's in East Germany and in Czechoslovakia is the reply, according to the Kremlin, to the Euromissiles. The logic of deterrence makes as much sense as a conversation between deaf men at an auction market.

Belgian public opinion is the more tempted to reject the Euromissiles since it appears to be persuaded of the effectiveness of the conventional forces marshalled by NATO against the Warsaw Pact. "The Belgians, like the other European countries," wrote the author of the memorandum, "are inclined to believe that nonnuclear forces should not be reinforced and that NATO is capable of preventing an attack on Western Europe." Only 7 percent of Belgians ask for an increase in the national military budget. On the other hand, those who want to see a reduction in military spending are five times as numerous.

For NATO military doctrine, conventional forces constituted the first stage in the graduated response. If this were to give way before the blows of a Soviet attack, what should NATO do? Only 14 percent of those questioned would approve the introduction of nuclear weapons. The rejection of the "first use" of atomic weapons is clearly the majority opinion. Nevertheless, a third of public opinion would accept the use of nuclear arms in the event of an atomic Soviet attack.

Although the basic tenets of NATO military doctrine are far from convincing the public, the Atlantic alliance is nevertheless held in high regard. There is no trace of neutralism among 68 percent of Belgians who believe that the security of their country depends on membership in NATO. There is no necessary relation therefore between saying "no" to Euromissiles and antiNATO sentiment.

However, there is doubt concerning the cohesion between the two sides of the Atlantic and on the respective roles of Europe and the United States in NATO. Whereas in 1981 6 Belgians out of 10 were convinced that the United States would come to Europe's rescue, even knowing that America would expose itself to a Soviet nuclear military attack, today only 46 percent of Belgians believe in an automatic American commitment alongside Europe.

This uneasiness seems to indicate that public opinion has not forgotten the comments of high American officials about the possibility of "a nuclear war limited to Europe" and that it is not far from believing Henry Kissinger when the latter remarked that the United States would hesitate before "sacrificing Boston to save Hamburg."

To this erosion of American credibility must be added a certain disappointment concerning the part played by the United States in "increasing the risk of war." While 17 percent of those questioned have confidence in the Soviet Union, only 4 Belgians out of 10 would vouch for American foreign policy. In October 1981, 6 Belgians out of 10 had a positive opinion. Granted, this transatlantic uneasiness is not catastrophic but it is all the more real inasmuch as the Europeans are a long way from offering their public a credible alternative, if only in the form of a strengthening of the European pillar of the alliance.

The poll was taken between last 15 and 29 May by the Belgian firm Dimarso, a Gallup associate.

The sample included 1,010 adults. The analysis dates to 25 July 1984.

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## NONSOCIALIST COALITION INCREASINGLY POPULAR WITH VOTERS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 23 Sep 84 pp 1,8

[Article by Michael Ehrenreich]

[Excerpts] Seventy-six percent of the electorate finds that the government has done a good or a fairly good job. The result is clearly better compared with any other government since the Liberal, Conservative, and Radical-Liberal coalition.

The four-leaf-clover government keeps getting good grades from the population, and the popularity enjoyed by the government among the voters is still considerably higher than immediately after the change of government on 10 September 1982.

Thirty-four percent of the voters find that the government has done a good job, while 42 percent find that the government has done a fairly good job. Only 18 percent find that the government has not done a good job, according to a recent Gallup poll taken on the popularity of the government among the Danish people.

The evaluations among the voters of the government thus seem to have become stabilized during the past 6 months. In a corresponding poll taken in March, 34 percent answered that the government had done a good job, and 40 percent answered that the government had done a fairly good job. Twenty-one percent answered that the government had not done a good job.

The figures are considerably lower than the hitherto best result of the four-leaf-clover government 12 months ago, when the corresponding figures were 43 percent, 39 percent, and 12 percent. Nevertheless, the result is still clearly better compared with any other government in Denmark since the Liberal, Conservative, and Radical-Liberal government in 1968-71.

Every 6 months, the Gallup Institute takes a poll of the popularity among the voters of the government in office at the time. A representative section of the population, comprising approximately 1000 persons, participates in these polls.

## Popularity of Government Levelled Off

From the almost dramatic peak of popularity reached by the nonsocialist government in the poll taken by the Gallup Institute in September of 1983--the highest level ever measured by the Gallup Institute--the popularity of the government now seems to have levelled off at a considerably lower level.

This appears from the most recent poll carried through last September.

At intervals of 6 months--apart from times when special circumstances make it important--the Gallup Institute undertakes current polls of the evaluation on the part of the electorate of the government in office at the time in question.

In such polls, a representative section of the electorate, comprising about 1,000 respondents, is asked the following question:

"Do you find that the present government has done a good job, a fairly good job or not a good job during the period in which it has been in office?"

The first poll is usually carried through approximately 3 months after the new government has come to power, and the first poll on the four-leaf-clover government was, therefore, carried through in early December of 1982.

The most recent poll was taken in September of 1984. The following table shows the result of the most recent poll, and for the sake of comparison, previous polls have been shown all the way back to the first poll of the popularity of the nonsocialist government in April of 1968 following the election in January of the same year:

As will appear from the table, the popularity of the government has increased somewhat, though not a great deal. The figures have remained largely unchanged from the last poll taken 6 months ago. However, in spite of everything, the nonsocialist government is today more popular than it was in the first poll taken after its came into power in December of 1982.

It is also worth noting that the number of voters who answered that the government had done a "good job" is still larger (34 percent) than in the case of any other government back to the period before the nonsocialist government came into power in 1968.

Government Managed:

|           |      | Well | Fairly Well | Well | Not Well | No Opinion | Total |
|-----------|------|------|-------------|------|----------|------------|-------|
|           |      | %    | %           | %    | %        | %          | %     |
| September | 1983 | 43   | 39          | 12   | 6        | 100        |       |
| March     | 1984 | 34   | 40          | 21   | 5        | 100        |       |
| September | 1984 | 34   | 42          | 18   | 6        | 100        |       |

Reprinting subject to indication of BERLINGSKE TIDENDE and the Gallup Institute as sources.

Asger Schultz

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## REPORT OF PRIME MINISTER SORSA'S TRIP TO USSR

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 23 Sep 84 p 9

[Article by Erkki Pennanen: "World Situation Does Not Cast Shadow on Finnish-Soviet Relations"]

[Text] Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa's official visit to the Soviet Union beginning next Tuesday will take place during a time of tensions on the international political scene. Therefore, it is considered significant that the deterioration of the international atmosphere, which has been transpiring for a long time, has not caused pressures on relations between Finland and the USSR.

The undisturbed nature of relations became evident in connection with the political preparations for the prime minister's visit as well as in the published articles and greetings of the Soviet leadership conveyed in connection with the 40th anniversary of the armistice agreement.

The most authoritative affirmation of this came from President and Party Chairman Konstantin Chernenko himself, who appeared Friday evening in a Finnish television program -- already in itself a rare gesture of friendship.

It has already become customary in connection with high-level meetings to emphasize that the development of Finnish-Soviet relations is not dependent on the fluctuations in the international situation. For the layman this statement may sound like meaningless political liturgy. For those who remember the diplomatic note crisis of 1961 and for experts who have followed the gloomy prospects of international development, this liturgy contains an important message even though it does not guarantee eternal salvation.

From the Soviet point of view international development has been deteriorating the whole time. A high-level dialogue with the United States and other leading countries of the West has been severely restricted. The Soviet Union considers that Ronald Reagan's United States is aspiring to military superiority and is preaching a crusade against communism. At the same time Bonn is being urged to woo the GDR and other allies of Moscow in spite of this.

The Soviet Union has been compelled to tighten its own belt, to become more entrenched, and exert considerable political pressure in order to ensure that its allies will remain within the fold.

The Soviet Union had to publicize the growing revengeful attitude of the FRG and the devil of militarism before Erich Honecker of the GDR and Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov comprehended how risky their planned visits to Bonn would have been in the present situation.

#### No Reflections on Northern Europe

In many quarters it has been feared that political reflexes could gradually extend to Northern Europe also. There was special concern at the end of last year when the United States began to deploy Pershing and cruise missiles in Western Europe. Even in Finland the political and military leadership hastened to make assurances to various quarters that measures have been taken to improve the ability to prevent the intrusion of cruise missiles.

However, it became evident in connection with Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen's official visit to the USSR last December that there was no desire in the Soviet Union to dramatize the effects of the changed situation in Central Europe on Northern Europe. References to such effects have also not been presented in connection with the press campaign warning against the rise of West German militarism and a revengeful attitude.

Even in the midst of this dismal international atmosphere the Soviet Union has reiterated its aspiration to continue detente and the limiting of armaments. Its only condition has been that the Reagan Administration recognize the Soviet Union as an equal negotiating partner and leave its sphere of influence alone.

The Soviet Union willingly presents its relations with Finland to the rest of the world as an example of how it has been able to accomplish a fruitful and equal cooperation for decades with a small country belonging to a different social system. Finland is a symbol of the CSCE principle and Soviet-Finnish relations are a living example of the application of these principles.

#### Chernenko's Television Statement

Konstantin Chernenko reaffirmed this in his television statement: "Together with you we have accumulated an enormously valuable stock of friendship and cooperation beneficial to both of us... I am convinced that the world community would profit much if the relations of all peoples and states were built in such a spirit."

In other words, Finland continues to hold an important position as a kind of show window and laboratory in Soviet policy at a time when it is a question of a cooperation beneficial to both a large and small country and a socialist and capitalist country. To the layman it may once again sound like a liturgy, but the expert sees in it a significant political assurance as long as there is even the slightest room for the principle of detente and cooperation in superpower politics.

Nevertheless, it would be misleading to depict political relations between Finland and the Soviet Union as totally free of problems. Even in connection

with the political preparations for Sorsa's visit it once again became apparent that the views of a country carrying out a neutral policy and of a superpower do not always coincide with respect to international problems and their causes.

Finland can join in the concern about international development, the threat of medium-range missiles, or the militarization of space. The situation becomes different if it is demanded that guilty parties also be publicly named. The withdrawal of a small neighbor into the protection of the cloak of neutrality may aggravate the superpower when it interprets this neutrality as fence-sitting.

#### Karjalainen's Visit Was A Redefining of Neutrality

In connection with the previous official visit of a prime minister in 1971 the Soviet Union pushed through a change in the definition of the nature of Finland's neutral policy in the negotiations on communiques. Instead of a "peace-loving neutral policy", the discussion was directed toward the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line, which "contains an aspiration to carry out a peaceful policy of neutrality".

No political news is expected from Sorsa's prime ministerial visit. On the contrary, its most important content will certainly be the emphasis on the continuity and stability of present relations. The Soviet Union will also proceed from the fact that the primary responsibility for the management of mutual relations belongs to a higher level -- to President Mauno Koivisto on the Finnish side.

Prime Minister Nikolay Tikhonov will be Sorsa's actual host and negotiating partner in the Kremlin. In accordance with established practice, a visiting prime minister will also meet President and Party Chairman Chernenko -- provided that his health will permit this.

The most recent important politician from the West to visit Moscow was English Foreign Minister Sir Geoffrey Home last July. Since Sorsa is also the chairman of the Disarmament Council of the Socialist International, his visit is also seen as an international event.

The problematical nature of Finnish and Soviet relations is presently concentrated in trade policy and daily economic cooperation. In recent years major fluctuations in both directions have been experienced in the balance of trade between the two countries and frequently problematical special arrangements have been needed for their rectification.

In Finland we have previously become accustomed to the fact that official visits have been connected with visible signings of agreements and the painting of breathless views of the future at the official level. Now cooperation has already reached such a level that we must be satisfied with less.

This time a new general trade agreement will be signed and there will be at least one agreement at the enterprise level on a cellulose plant in Viipuri [Vyborg]. An agreement on a nuclear icebreaker as well as on the continuation of the gas pipeline is imminent. By virtue of their position there will be a substantial representation of Finland's industrial leaders in the prime minister's delegation.

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## RURAL PARTY'S PELTOLA NAMED CHIEF OF FINNISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 21 Sep 84 pp 3, 12

[Article: "Veikko Veniamo Rammed Through Candidacy of Rural" Party's Peltola"]

[Text] On Thursday the Finnish Rural Party's Parliamentary Faction Chairman Veikko Veniamo pushed through Olavi K. Peltola as the party's candidate for area operations director of Yleisradio [Finnish Broadcasting Corporation].

The faction almost had to take a vote on the issue, but faction leader Veniamo's proposal for a meeting prevented a troublesome vote.

The party's governing body, which had deliberated the directorship question until late Wednesday evening, apparently did not reach a unanimous decision and placed the decision on the shoulders of the parliamentary faction.

Editorial Secretary Peltola of SUOMEN UUTISET, the chief organ of the SMP [Finnish Rural Party], and party Information Chief Kari Raisanen, who was supported by many of the MP's, were opposing candidates in the race for the directorship post.

Veikko Veniamo, who opened the faction meeting, asked whether the party's executive council has a proposal for the selection of area director. At that time the party chairman, Second Finance Minister Pekka Veniamo, announced that J. Juhani Kortesalmi, who represents the parliamentary faction in the executive council, will take the floor.

Kortesalmi, who was himself considered for the post last spring, proposed Peltola, 49, as area director. However, MP Anssi Joutsenlahti, who proposed Vieeno Ecklund's candidate, Raisanen, as area director, was of a different opinion.

Meeting Was Adjourned

Veniamo, who observed the possibility of a troublesome vote, hastened to adjourn the meeting. A work group was appointed to deliberate the directorship question. It consisted of Veniamo himself as well as MP's Mikko Vainio, Liisa Aranz, Joutsenlahti, and Party Secretary Aaro Niiranen.

As the work group deliberated the issue, the other MP's were dismissed to the parliament's coffee shop for a break. When the faction reconvened, Joutsen-lahti, who had proposed Raisanen, changed his mind, and the work group proposed Peltola, 49, for the task. The surprised parliamentary faction submitted to the proposal, and thus a unanimous decision was accomplished.

If the dispute had gone to a vote, the result would have been quite equally matched according to the estimates. Since the party split in 1970, it has been the custom in the SMP to avoid votes until the very end. Raisanen's position as secretary of the Constitutional Party in the 1970's was considered to be his ballast.

A vacancy for the post of area director appeared again after Reijo Enavaara, who was appointed in the spring, died in August.

SMP Chairman P Venamo emphasized that Peltola meets the professional requirements of the job and considered the proposal to be good from the point of view of the party.

Peltola, who has a degree in political science, has been editorial secretary of the SUOMEN UUTISET two different times: first in 1970--75 and again since 1980.

Peltola emphasized that he is only a candidate for the post of area director, which was established as a new position as part of the reorganization of the Finnish Broadcasting Corporation negotiated last spring.

Peltola considered his experience in the Finnish Broadcasting Corporation to be weak, but recalled that he has participated in panel discussions on radio policy. He said that his name was included in the considerations for director a couple weeks ago.

Peltola believes that other suitable candidates can be found from the SMP and considers that experience in the Finnish Broadcasting corporation is not important in the work of area director since "it is doubtful that one will have to write scripts".

In Peltola's opinion an applicant armed with a membership book is acceptable for the post as long as other qualifications are present. He said that he will first perform the duties and only then will he deliberate the policy he will promote. It is doubtful there will be any great upheavals according to Peltola.

Peltola has been a member of the Finnish Rural Party for 18 years. As an auditor for the City of Helsinki he has studied the affairs for metro, among other things, along with Liisa Kulhia for the last 2 years.

The board of directors of the Finnish Broadcasting Corporation will most likely confirm Peltola's appointment on Friday.

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## FORMER CP CHAIRMAN SAARINEN'S MEMOIRS STIR CONTROVERSY

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 22 Sep 84 p 9

[Article: "Koivisto and Holkeri Were Acceptable to Moscow"]

[Text] The Soviet Union made an equal appraisal of SDP presidential candidate Mauno Koivisto and Conservative Party presidential candidate Harri Holkeri in November 1981, a little less than 2 months before the January 1982 electoral elections. On the other hand, Johannes Virolainen was not desirable from the Soviet point of view.

This is former SKP Chairman Aarne Saarinen's recollection of the 1981 presidential elections in a recent memoir, "Aarne Saarinen, The Experiences of A Finnish Communist".

Saarinen himself characterizes his book partially as a memoir and partially as an expression of opinions. Attention is given in the book to relations between the SKP [Finnish Communist Party] and the Soviet Communist Party, but the presidential elections and the SKP's attitude toward government cooperation are also discussed.

As far as the presidential elections are concerned, Saarinen recalls two discussions, the first of which he held with Esa Timonen (Center Party member), governor of the Province of Northern Karelia, and the second with Viktor Vladimirov, minister-counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Finland.

Saarinen states that Timonen met him on a certain evening in December. Timonen stated that he had worked on behalf of the election of Dr. Ahti Karjalainen as the Center Party's candidate and with this in mind he made contact with Vladimirov.

At that time Karjalainen had lost the Center Party's candidacy to Virolainen by a large margin. Timonen asked Saarinen whether there is reason to continue working on behalf of Karjalainen. Saarinen states that he answered that it is not worth it.

After that, Saarinen himself made contact with Vladimirov. I received confirmation that the Soviet Union will not interfere in the presidential issue, states Saarinen.

### "Somewhat Surprising"

"However, I asked of what opinion they were with respect to the nominated candidates. The answer I received was that Johannes Virolainen is not desirable, but Mauno Koivisto and Harri Holkeri are equal in their eyes, neither one has done anything wrong: They both have their good and bad sides," writes Saarinen. He mentions that he considered Vladimirov's announcement to be "somewhat surprising".

Saarinen discloses the role of the party's minority in the presidential elections and its work on behalf of Karjalainen in strong language. Saarinen's considers the minority's actions as political irresponsibility and childish capriciousness.

In his memoirs Saarinen repeats his own reservations about Mauno Koivisto, whom he considered to be uncertain and equivocal. The SKP's former chairman also points out the Nordek events.

### Saarinen Proposed Sorsa

Saarinen states that he had a discussion with SDP Chairman Kalevi Sorsa in the fall of 1981 and at that time proposed that Sorsa could be the joint presidential candidate of the left wing. Sorsa, however, terminated the discussion by confirming that the SDP's candidate is Koivisto.

Saarinen also writes about a certain discussion in Moscow in the spring of 1981. At a meeting of SKP and CPSU delegations the CPSU's Boris Ponomarev asked whether Koivisto could continue the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line.

According to Saarinen, Ville Pessi had answered that he does not place complete confidence in this. Majority representative Olavi Poikolainen, on the other hand, stated according to Saarinen that he would not consider this to be impossible.

### Exploitation of Kekkonen

In his book Saarinen also relates events in the spring of 1981 when the Center Party made an attempt according to Saarinen to bring about the fall of the government and make Karjalainen the prime minister.

On Friday Saarinen estimated that President Urho Kekkonen was no longer at his best at that time, "this was apparent even in other connections".

Kekkonen began to suffer from memory lapses and slips of the tongue according to Saarinen. In Saarinen's opinion "those who were in regular and constant contact with him could take advantage" of the president's weakness.

Saarinen also disclosed that President Mauno Koivisto was in some respects concerned about his forthcoming book.

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## CHAIRMAN DESIGNATE OF SKDL ON OWN LEAGUE, COMMUNIST RIFT

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 23 Sep 84 p 30

[Article by Pekka Vuoristo: "Leader Through the Teeth"]

[Text] Reijo Kakela is one of those who at one time was called a bearded radical.

You remember the 1960's. He studied in Helsinki. He read Marx with friends in study circles. He became completely involved in university student demonstrations. He was involved when the Vanha [Old Student Building] was taken over in 1968. He received an indictment for inciting a refusal to bear arms in the Schuller case in 1969. He was active in Sadankomitea [Committee of One-Hundred] and was the chief editor of YDIN.

He is from a working class home. He joined the Social Democrats early in life. He was disappointed and joined the People's Democrats. He then joined the Communists at the height of the party conflict in 1971.

He has an academic degree. He is employed as a special research worker in the Education Ministry. He is 41. He has a beard. He weighs about 200. He likes beer. He smokes. He continues to dress in sweaters and cords.

What is missing? At most a bourgeois home and a Taistoite [Stalinist] phase.

But Reijo Kakela cannot be a Taistoite. He is to become general secretary of the Finnish People's Democratic League in November.

Reijo Kakela is a rather unknown person since he is not a politician. He is mostly known as the husband of writer Kaarina Helakisa. He does not like to be in the public eye. He is apparently troubled in having to answer questions-- he sighs, leans on his elbows and is impatient.

He does not intend "under any circumstance ever" to run for parliament. Nevertheless, he has behind him a rather substantial political career.

After a year of teaching ("hard work and little appreciated, I could not take it") he became secretary of the SKDL's School Policy Committee. At that time

he became acquainted with Kalevi Kivistö, who was then chairman of the committee.

In 1972 Reijo Kakela received a position in the Education Ministry. At the same time he was given several commissions of trust in the SKDL and the SKP [Finnish Communist Party].

Kivistö became education minister in 1975 and chose Kakela as political secretary. Kakela held this post for several years. In between he engaged in his regular job of his own free will: "I wanted something easier to do."

In the SKP Reijo Kakela became Arvo Aalto's man. He was considered to be Aalto's most important theoretical force behind the scenes even though he himself down-grades this assessment: "I have written a few speeches and have had several discussions with Arvo."

Reijo Kakela was elected to the SKP Central Committee at the congress last May. He consented to the position of SKDL general secretary upon the wishes of Kalevi Kivistö and Arvo Aalto.

#### What Made Him Change His Mind?

So far Reijo Kakela has admitted twice that he has sought "easier jobs". What would now make him transfer from a good position to the thankless job of general secretary -- a 7-day-a-week job and a salary of 6,900 markkaa.

"I am not really excited about it," he says and sighs: "This is quite a complicated story."

"Over the years I have grumbled quite a bit. Now that an opportunity is being offered, I must consider whether I should remain in my grumbling position or dare to do something. I believe that I can accomplish something."

The SKDL is at the lowest point in its history -- support fluctuates around 12--13 percent. But in Reijo Kakela's opinion "one can cheer that things are even this good".

"The worst effect of the conflict has been that the movement has been demoralized. The SKP's conflict has taken away some of the SKDL's spirit of comradeship, trust, and readiness to work on behalf of the movement -- they have been replaced with discouragement, an atmosphere of submission and indifference.

"At the same time the SKDL has not taken notice of the change in the structure of society and in people's lifestyles."

After thinking for a moment Reijo Kakela becomes inspired:

"I would like to stress that fact that the People's Democrats need not feel they have to walk along side the wall because of their anguish. They can be proud of what they have achieved and what they can still achieve in society."

In the SKP Kakela is a strong supporter of the majority from the very beginning. Even before the extraordinary congress in 1982 he joined those who believed in the abilities of Jouko Kajanoja and the third line.

"This is not an illusion. It became immediately clear during the first summer that matters only became worse and went quite out of control. The third line became a third faction."

Kakela, Terho Pursiainen and Esko Vainionpaa negotiated with Arvo Aalto in August 1983. Those negotiations were the impetus for the armored train by which Aalto was driven to the chairmanship and the minority was driven to the sidelines.

"There was no conspiracy in this. But many observed that it was no longer a matter of primary importance as to who is right, but how the party can be saved from destruction. And how the majority's original ideals can be saved -- tolerance, broad-mindedness, and a rejection of all the remnants of the underground era," states Reijo Kakela in depicting the situation.

#### Is He a Version of Pursiainen?

Reijo Kakela is a philosopher and a theoretician. He gives complicated answers to simple questions and absolutely prodigious answers to complex questions.

For example: how do Arvo Aalto's hard line and radical organizational measures accomplish "the majority's original ideals"?

He sighs.

"This is a general moral question. Can the release of evil be opposed by evil means? Can I be a saint if I refrain from these means and thus allow evil to be let loose? On the other hand, it is diabolical if I myself am guilty of that which I want to oppose.

"If evil means are used, at least the rules must be reconciled. And one must be extremely sensitive to this question. Means must not be approved without any further consideration, they must be considered as a problem.

"The matter is, indeed, quite difficult. The minority chose the weapons -- the majority had to decide whether or not it would fight. Now we are in the eye of the storm and the future will decide how we have succeeded."

After pausing for a minute, Reijo Kakela adds that he does not want to equate "evil" and the minority. His choice of word is not political, but philosophical and ecclesiastical.

Reijo Kakela is by education a candidate of theology. This has caused many to raise their eyebrows: is he a kind of version of Terho Pursiainen?

"I cannot begin to understand why this is of such interest. Even Stalin was a seminary student," remarks Kakela, but answers anyway when asked:

He was guided into the church through youth activities as a boy growing up on Kankuri Street. During his time at the lyceum he spent several summers at the parish camp in Kivisaari and engaged in construction work. Religious questions interested him when he began his studies. In time he observed that he was on the wrong path, but he continued until the end since "there one can obtain an all-around education". He never intended to become a minister of the church, but a scholar.

And how has Reijo Kakela embraced his own ideals -- socialism, broad-mindedness, and so on?

"Who can say what has influenced any particular decision in one's life? I myself am, naturally, of the opinion that I made my decisions independently and that no wave of radicalism snatched me along. But looking at it objectively: the atmosphere and social relations of a young student directed the thinking of a whole generation," he says in pondering the situation.

"We for the first time encountered developing countries, questions of peace, the ossifications of society -- indeed, it was real knowledge, on the basis of which opinions could be formed."

#### How Does An Idealist of the 1960's Manage?

And how does a theoretical-philosophical idealist of the 1960's manage when he becomes the general secretary of the SKDL?

The position of Jorma Hentila, who is finishing up a long term as general secretary, was difficult since the SKP was engaged in its own dispute. A struggle was waged over the SKDL's goals, duties and independence. But the SKP's weakness also gave freedom to the SKDL. The SKDL's machinery was important to the party's majority. The SKDL's political power was at its height when Kalevi Kivistö kept Mauno Koivisto's government intact.

Reijo Kakela's position, for its part, is difficult since the SKP's dispute is being resolved. The party leadership has been purged and the party machinery is being cleaned and oiled.

It is not known what the intentions of the minority are. Will it establish a new party? Will a new party apply for membership in the SKDL? Will the minority remain in the old party? Will the SKDL also have to be purged? If the SKP splits, will a portion of the majority or the minority remain in between? What will the SKDL do about it?

Reijo Kakela sighs even deeper as the alternatives are enumerated. He knows that as a "supporter of Aalto" he is expected to take tough stands if necessary. But he does not yet want to define the solutions -- there is still time until the SKDL congress next spring.

"I hope that the SKDL could retain its contact with the minority, at least a part of it. The SKP's dispute has, indeed, placed a burden on the SKDL's work, meetings have been like sessions of a municipal court. But the rules have not been broken as in the SKP," he deliberates.

Reijo Kakela willingly turns the discussion from tactics to theory. He would like to see the SKDL achieve a "theoretical independence". He explains what he means by this.

"The party has looked at the SKDL as a machinery, in which there are member organizations. It has been asked what power relationships are dominant in the making of a decision. We should be able to go beyond this."

The SKDL's objectives have been direct practical reform goals. They have been founded on the smallest common denominator of the member organizations' own ideals.

In Kakela's opinion the SKDL's goals should be placed on the foundation of the SKDL's own theoretical thinking. This independent theoretical base would be developed by means of a discussion among the SKDL's members. It would not be "its model of socialism", but rather a model determined by "progressive" content.

"Even I do not know what progress is. It is also a question of generation. The world sets limits on traditional Marxist progressive thinking.

"And at the same time that progress is being deliberated, consideration should be given to what is the SKDL's task as an independent factor in order to achieve progress," says the future general secretary.

"Now do you understand?" he asks in conclusion, and sighs.

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CSO: 3617/233

## CHERENKO'S HEALTH, SOVIET POWER STRUGGLE ANALYZED

Paris LE FIGARO in French 24 Sep 84 p 5

[Article by Charles Lambroschini: "USSR: The Struggle for Power Continues"]

[Text] Today Konstantin Chernenko celebrates his 73rd birthday. But there is not much to celebrate. Condemned by his poor health only to unveil chrysanthemums, the Soviet president seems as weak physically as he is politically.

After having disappeared for 53 days this summer, Chernenko appeared on television three times in 3 weeks. Always on formal occasions: a distribution of medals to three cosmonauts on 6 September, the presentation of the Order of Lenin to the head of the Greek Communist Party on the 18th, and the reading of a message celebrating the 40th anniversary of the armistice between the USSR and Finland, on 21 September.

Always with visible difficulties. When Chernenko addressed the cosmonauts, the tan he acquired during his vacation at the Black Sea was not sufficient to conceal his weight loss and his usual shortness of breath which, according to Western doctors who have observed him from afar, is the symptom of irreversible emphysema.

His second performance left the impression of an even more frail man. Chernenko's face was puffy and marked with red blotches. Finally, swallowing his words and stumbling over the paragraphs, he had trouble getting to the end of his text. And yet, rather than daring a direct broadcast, Soviet television had taken the precaution of recording it beforehand. Western technicians who, according to the REUTER news agency, based their analysis on the many picture shift changes by the cameras, estimate that this 3 minute speech required nine cuts. Hence, that many retakes.

Those appearances are orchestrated to deny rumors and speculation on the seriousness of Chernenko's health problems. Far from appeasing them, they are nourishing them as signs of political deterioration are increasing. Over the 7 months since he succeeded Yuri Andropov, Chernenko has obviously not succeeded in establishing his power.

The only plenum of the Central Committee which has taken place (in April) was not marked by any changes: not in the Secretariat and not in the Politburo. Additional clue: the numerous commentaries the press dedicated last summer

to the reform of education and to ideological problems rarely made reference to Chernenko. And yet those are the two areas in which the Soviet president has always wanted to show his influence.

Another example: the PRAVDA "interview" of 1 September. Chernenko seemed to have made a gesture toward the Americans by giving the impression that, in exchange for a concession on the issue of the demilitarization of space, the Soviets would be willing to return to strategic arms negotiations. Three days later, Chernenko suffered the humiliation of a denial by his own Ministry of Foreign Affairs. No, the Western media had misunderstood the whole thing: conciliation was out of the question.

Even while confined to bed, from August 1983 until February 1984, Andropov had shown far greater dynamism. The three plenums of the Central Committee called under his patronage ended with the promotion of a whole contingent of new faces. In total: 9 out of 23 department heads in the Central Committee, 11 out of 64 ministers, 20 percent of the regional party officials.

Until the very end, Andropov also continued to intervene in major current affairs. Last 24 January, he gave an "interview" to PRAVDA in which he repeated that the Soviets would agree to take the road back to Geneva only on the day when the Americans withdrew their Pershing and their Cruise missiles. Andropov died on 9 February.

#### Romanov-Gorbachev Battle

As a result of the fading away of Chernenko, candidates for his possible succession do not mind lining themselves up already. Specifically Mikhail Gorbachev, 53 years old, the heir apparent in the official order of precedence, and Grigoriy Romanov, 60 years old. The trips they have just completed abroad earned them coverage by Soviet television which drew a great deal of attention. The kind that is usually reserved for travel by the head of state.

In this context, some Kremlinologists believe that the disgrace of chief of staff Marshal Ogarkov may well have been the result of a battle between Romanov, who is tied to the military through his responsibilities in the sector of defense industries, and Gorbachev who is supposed to have emerged the victor. This hypothesis is a little too forced to necessarily outweigh other more "logical" explanations. It is nevertheless symptomatic of a climate of intrigues.

Thus the majority of observers have attached great importance to the scuffle of the signatures for which two obituary notices published in PRAVDA seem to have been the pretext. For Marshal Poluboyakov, whose death was announced on 20 September, Gorbachev had appended his signature, but not Chernenko. The next day, for Andrey Buvar, a university expert in metallurgy, the opposite was true: Chernenko had signed, but not Gorbachev.

Conclusion: perhaps the paralysis at the top which was betrayed in recent months by the uncompromising attitude of the Soviet Union in its relations with the outside world, is turning into a general race for the big prize.

Reformists loyal to Andropov's memory against conservatives nostalgic for Brezhnev, and civilians against military as the fall of Ogarkov indicated. But also competition among the "young": Gorbachev against Romanov. And who knows, perhaps also among generals if Ogarkov, a champion of strategic reconversion, was the victim of a quarrel between the old guard and the new. Finally, one should not forget Andrey Gromyko who, as the undisputed master of the diplomatic preserve during this endless transition period since Brezhnev's death, represents the continuity of the foreign policy of the USSR.

While the various clans are getting ready for the outcome, it is hard to predict what effect Friday's meeting between Gromyko and President Reagan will have. A new beginning or another impasse...

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CSO: 3519/3

**PLO'S SALAH KHALAF SEES GOOD RELATIONS WITH FRANCE**

Paris LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS in French 12 Sep 84 p 17

[Article by D. L.: "The PLO Refuses to Aggravate Its Relations With France"]

[Text] There are no Palestinian "bad feelings" for France--this is the basic message that Abou Iyad, one of the major leaders of El Fatah, wanted to transmit yesterday while receiving a group of French journalists in Paris. "We favorably welcome," he stated, "the improvement of relations between France and Syria." He added that there is no reason for this to be "at the expense of the PLO." The meeting between Yasser Arafat and Claude Cheysson in Tunis allowed this issue and several others to be "clarified." In short, there are no clouds between the PLO and France, even if the Palestinians want Paris to play a "more effective" role in the Middle East.

The recent statement in LE MONDE by Khaled El Hassan, who, in moderate terms, spoke of being careful of the French authorities and expressed the fear that a French rapprochement with Syria would be at the expense of French-Palestinian relations, met with extreme displeasure at the Elysee, we have heard. However, it was followed by an appeasing statement by Farouk Kaddoumi and a meeting in Tunis between Claude Cheysson and the leader of the PLO who, at that time, asked him to transmit his "thanks" to the French head of state.

But yesterday in his turn Abou Iyad certainly wanted to clarify things by addressing French public opinion as Khaled El Hassan had done. Even if they are nourishing some fears which the recent statements by Claude Cheysson on Radio-France-Inter about the PLO's "loss of influence" have not appeased, the Palestinians are evidently planning to do nothing that could muddy their relations with France. Aside from this "clarification" Abou Iyad affirmed yesterday that the National Palestinian Council (the PLO parliament), which Damascus is trying to prevent from meeting, would meet as planned, i.e., at the end of this month. He added that this meeting is supposed to be in Algiers, but even if the Algerians are not able to host it it will take place, "whether in San'a, Jeddah, Aden, Baghdad or Teheran." "We definitely want," he explained, "to give a last chance to Arab mediation efforts, but the National Council cannot be suspended indefinitely."

As to the reasons for his visit to Paris, however, Abou Iyad remained very discreet. "A private visit," said the PLO office...where it seems that the Elysee's diplomatic methods have gathered some praise.

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CSO:3519/21

## CHIRAC COMMENTS ON FABIUS, YOUNG RPR LEADERS

Paris LE MONDE in French 12 Sep 84 p 6

[Article by A. P.: "Jacques Chirac Believes 'Easing Up' Is Impossible and Promises to Give the Young Their Place"]

[Text] Jacques Chirac, who will be in Japan from 16 to 22 September for the "Paris-Tokyo week," wants to clarify his attitude and the attitude of the RPR toward the new prime minister before his departure. His position can be summarized in two phrases: his opposition to those in power has not weakened and the RPR is "neither charmed nor upset."

The mayor of Paris, who was invited on Monday 10 September by the "Colbert Committee," which includes industries that export luxury items, was questioned on the idea of "easing up" and stated: "If that means more polite language, then it is desirable. However in France that seems to me a bit impossible. By temperament the French are, as they say, hot-headed and--aside from important national ordeals, which are not common--they are always fighting among themselves."

The mayor of Paris summed up his thoughts thus: "There should be an easing up but there cannot be," he said before adding, "if this involves finding a way to have a compromise then it is totally impossible. I have nothing in common with Fabius which Mitterrand has not hesitated to correct. The suppositions of Mitterrand and the opposition correspond to two very different types of life in society. And within the opposition nobody in a position of responsibility wants to compromise with a doctrine that is on hold."

According to the president of the RPR, the policy begun by Fabius is not capable of reversing the current situation, which is characterized by flashing red lights in all areas, whereas in almost all other countries they would change to green. Chirac believes that the behavior of Fabius is guided by the necessity of "finding compensations for the difficulties born of the economic situation and the desertion of the Communists."

The next battle will be about the issue of reforming the election law. He admits that the administration could certainly have the law of its choice adopted with the percentage that it wants but because it must first look out for its own interests "it will be interesting to see how it cheats."

When he is questioned about the rumblings, the divergences or the moods within the RPR, Chirac asks in turn that you list for him the number of unorthodox statements made by members of his party.

It is "perfectly natural" for Michel Barnier, RPR deputy from Savoie to receive the head of state because Barnier is the president of the county council and, stated Chirac, what he said was "irreproachable" and nothing in his statements "gives the idea of collaboration or seduction."

The president of the RPR also met with his young colleague before Mitterrand went to Chambery. The absolution given thereby contrasts with the more severe warnings given to Barnier by other RPR leaders--Pons, Labbe and Pasqua.

In the eyes of Chirac it is the height of "presumptuousness" for Michel Noir, RPR deputy from the Rhone, to have complained in several interviews that "the 35 to 45-year-old generation has so little right to speak" and that in the RPR "there is not enough debate on the challenging questions for France in the 10 years to come." Chirac points out that Noir himself, at the age of 30 in 1974, was national delegate for communication of the UDR, national secretary for activities of the RPR in 1979 and today is committee chairperson for industrial issues. The president of the RPR added: "Wasn't he allowed to express himself during his unfortunate municipal campaign in Lyon where he headed a ticket?"\*

It very definitely irritates Chirac that Philippe Seguin, RPR deputy from the Vosges and mayor of Epinal, openly criticized (LE MONDE 19-20 August) the opposition's attitudes after the appointment of Fabius. "He is not," assured Chirac, "the representative of the opposition's thoughts, whether they are the RPR's or the UDF's. Seguin has a place to himself--he is a Seguinist." The irritation that the Vosges deputy caused is so great today that next April when his mandate as vice-president of the Assembly will have to be renewed he could well be replaced by another deputy.

When Alain Juppe, assistant to the mayor of Paris and member of the central committee spoke about a desirable "ministerial change" to the RPR it was, however, considered a "verbal slip" due to summer relaxation. Chirac quickly added that "Mr. Juppe cannot be suspected of any spirit of compromise whatsoever." On Saturday 9 September the mayor's advisor did clarify his thoughts by saying, "I am not in favor of the coconut technique, but rather of a harmonious balance between generations. The biggest favor we can do for Jacques Chirac is to show him that he is not enclosed in a square of nostalgic persons from the Restoration and that he is surrounded by a new group for whom he is the incarnation of France's future."

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\* In the first round of municipal elections on 6 March 1983 the "83-89" tickets supported by Michel Noir received 30.6 percent of the votes and those led by Francisque Collomb, outgoing mayor, under the heading "Lyon First of All" got 36.4 percent of the votes. After the second round Collomb, an independent senator, kept his mandate as mayor of Lyon.

This explanation, which was actually a public apology, could become fact when the leaders are installed during the national meeting in Grenoble on 17 and 18 November. Representatives of the new generations, the young who are elected and those who aspire to be elected will receive their responsibilities and will surround Bernard Pons, who should be confirmed as secretary general.

This meeting, which will be the last before the Parliamentary elections of 1986, will be very important and Chirac will be able to show what lessons he can draw, despite everything, from the upsets that the party he founded on 5 December 1976 has undergone.

#### Mr. Messmer and the "Easing Up"

Pierre Messmer, RPR deputy from Moselle, who will not participate in the next "Parliamentary days" of his party because of his busy schedule, stated on Monday 10 September in Heming (Moselle): "Easing up, yes, collaboration, no." He added, "In politics we are adversaries, yes, but not enemies. The operation headed by Laurent Fabius is not of the same type. He is looking for a majority idea like Edgar Faure tried to do. This is not a question of easing up but of collaboration. I don't see who in the opposition could be part of such an operation."

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CSO:3519/21

## FUTURE PCF ACTIONS, LEADING PERSONALITIES ANALYZED

## PCF Evolution

Paris LE MONDE in French 16,17 Sep 84 p 1

[Text] The tactical withdrawal in June enabled the leadership to regain ground lost to the dissidents.

The Central Committee of the French Communist Party [PCF], which is meeting on 17-19 September, is expected to discuss a report by Georges Marchais on the political situation and preparations for the 25th party congress which is scheduled to be held in February. The situation within the PCF has changed considerably since the Central Committee meeting of 26-27 June--in part because of the outcome of the European elections (the PCF received 11.28 percent of the vote) and in part because of questions and complaints about that outcome from various party officials.

Mr Gaston Plissonnier, member of the Central Committee secretariat, said on Friday 14 September, during a luncheon for the press in honor of the appearance of his new book, that the report presented by Mr Claude Poperen, member of the political bureau--and not initially submitted to the Central Committee--had subsequently been accepted unanimously by that body, through passage of a resolution referring to it. This statement, which came as a surprise to some members of the Central Committee, shows that the party leadership's tactical withdrawal at that point in time has since been used to good advantage, to debate the significance of the European elections.

From that point of view, the change of government and the decision not to participate in the government of Mr Laurent Fabius served as a convenient pretext for shifting the focus of the talks. The issue is no longer the evolution of the PCF, its organizational style, or the effectiveness of its analysis of "real socialism." "Mobilization will be the watchword of the Central Committee debates," said Mr Plissonnier. "We want to mobilize all of the French people who believed in the promises of the left."

The presentation by the PCF leadership, headed by Mr Marchais, has been prepared. "Participation in the common program was a mistake," said Mr Plissonnier. The PCF "has come to the end of a 25-year experiment; the party will never renounce the policy of unity, but we are not going to proclaim, 'Union of the left! Union of the left!'" Nevertheless, Mr Plissonnier added, "election campaigns are a different matter entirely. We will have to see when

the time comes." This question of a campaign alliance and its constraints is one which it will be difficult for the Central Committee to ignore.

However that may be, the core party leadership appears to be tightly unified. Within that core group, the key roles appear to be played by Mr Plissonnier and Mr Roland Leroy, editor of L'HUMANITE, along with Andre Lajoinie, president of the Communist caucus in the National Assembly, Maxime Gremetz, who is responsible for external policy, and of course Mr Marchais himself. Mr Plissonnier, a career professional, and Mr Leroy, a man of influence: two leaders whose personalities should be kept in mind if one wants to understand the evolution of the PCF in the months to come.

#### Plissonnier's Role

Paris LE MONDE in French 16,17 Sep 84 p 8

[Text] "As administrative secretary, I do get involved in many things," says Mr Gaston Plissonnier modestly. To hear him talk, Mr Plissonnier is nothing else--nothing more, in fact--than an administrator, someone who handles the party's mail and countersigns expense vouchers for his associates on the Central Committee. Of course, he also provides "coordination between the secretariat and the political bureau," and, for that reason attends all the leadership meetings, which means that he is privy to "the party secrets." But he adds immediately: "There are no secrets; it is just our internal affairs."

Mr Plissonnier has been administrative secretary of the PCF for 30 years and a member of the political bureau for 20 years. He has been awarded the Soviet Order of the October Revolution. He has indeed been "involved" in many things. Invited to Paris in November 1953 (he had been first secretary of the Loir-et-Cher Federation since May 1948) to serve as Mr Auguste Lecoeur's deputy, Mr Plissonnier was to profit from the reallocation of responsibilities which up to that time had been in the hands of the organization secretary, who soon lost the party leadership role.

The importance of the position he occupies is attested, for example, by the fact that in March 1953, when he was not yet a member of the political bureau, he participated in the bureau's meeting with Maurice Thorez, in Bazainville, following the 20th Congress of the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union]--the "destalinization" congress.

Born on 11 July 1913 in Bantanges (Saone-et-Loire), a boyhood friend of Waldeck-Rochet, a fellow Burgundian, Mr Plissonnier truly rose from the ranks of the Resistance, and by the end of the war he was head of the Southwest Zone. This was where he received his real training as a militant and a Communist official. Did the experience leave him with an enduring taste for secrecy and discretion--traits that would serve him well in his subsequent career? "Some people have such a picture of me, but actually I do not think I have any special talent for conspiracy," he says in the book of interviews he has just published.\*

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\* "Une Vie Pour Lutter: Entretiens avec Mme Danielle Bleitrach," Editions Messidor, 223 pages, Fr 85.

In any case, Mr Plissonnier has drawn some lessons from the 1939-1945 period which today he is passing on to the younger generation as food for thought. Not historical lessons: the past is rather harshly treated, when it is not ignored altogether. The political lessons, on the other hand, stand out clearly. In 1939, Mr Plissonnier explains, the PCF was isolated, and "if there had been elections at that time, the results would probably not have been cause for celebration. But," he adds, "if the party had yielded to the ideological spirit of the times, it would have paid a heavy price later on. In my life in politics I have learned that winning requires more than just being right." And Mr Plissonnier indeed seems to exemplify the rule of conduct he proposes to the militants when he quotes from a letter he sent to Waldeck-Rochet in late 1939, following the signing of the German-Soviet pact and the banning of the PCF: "We do not understand, but we are standing fast."

Of course he agrees that things have changed. Today issues can be debated within the party organs, and the party officially admits "falling behind" in 1956. But he told the journalists invited to the press luncheon on Friday 14 September that "I am not like some who think that the party is to blame for its setbacks. In my view, my party is the best."

#### Leroy's Role

Paris LE MONDE in French 16,17 Sep 84 p 8

[Text] Mr Roland Leroy was pleased to announce the policy of the Communist Party. "We are no longer in the majority, since we are no longer in the government," he told Mr Laurent Fabius on 6 September. Fabius had appealed to the Communists on television the previous evening to clarify their position. One can well imagine the feelings he has cherished toward Mr Fabius ever since the latter arrived in his department--Seine-Maritime--in 1977. No doubt he took particular pleasure, in his 9 September speech for the L'HUMANITE festival, in cutting the prime minister's policies to pieces.

Mr Leroy announces the policies of the PCF. Does he make them? One might think so to see the way the editor of L'HUMANITE organized "his" festival, making a policy speech before the assembled members of the Central Committee, while Mr Pierre Juquin--a member of the political bureau for whom Mr Leroy has never disguised his lack of esteem--sat in the back. There was no debate at the L'HUMANITE festival: Mr Leroy made that decision, and Mr Georges Marchais did not veto it. The L'HUMANITE editor was a smiling participant in the reception held at the REVOLUTION stall by the weekly's staff, who had proposed holding such discussions after being criticized by certain Communist officials and militants. Mr Leroy was at his ease.

Mr Leroy, 55, joined the secretariat of the PCF Central Committee at about the same time as Mr Georges Marchais (who is 6 years older), very early in the 1960's, following the expulsion of Marcel Servin and Laurent Casanova from the Central Committee. He was ousted from the secretariat at the 23rd Congress in May 1979. This disgrace had come as a surprise: that congress had put the party seal of approval on the "line" promoted by the editor of L'HUMANITE. One might have concluded that the secretary general, following a long-established tradition, had jettisoned the advocate of a policy that had been approved over his opposition, and for which he ultimately had to take responsibility.

The reality, we can see today, was more complex. "I am still there," Mr Leroy said at the end of the congress. Ousted from the secretariat, while two

Marchais loyalists--Mr Maxime Gremetz and Mrs Gisele Moreau--were added to that body, Mr Leroy nevertheless remained as editor of L'HUMANITE, an extremely important position, since that daily paper is the primary vehicle for informing the militants about party policy. To the extent that REVOLUTION might attempt, each week, to compete with L'HUMANITE for influence (and party intellectuals say that was its purpose), Mr Leroy has ably defended his turf. For a long time REVOLUTION was unable to get any "promotional publicity" in the pages of L'HUMANITE.

#### The Museum

The party daily extricated itself from the grip of its critics, by "purges", by individual departures and, after 1981, by shifting toward public service. Mr Leroy said to anyone who cared to listen: it was time for the emergence of a new generation of Communist cadres, a generation that had been marked by the experience of the rupture of 1977 and the return to the "union at the base," rather than by the common program with the Socialists. As master in his own house, Mr Leroy made L'HUMANITE the showcase and the laboratory--some would say the museum--of a communism that stands firm on its "class positions" and on solidarity with socialist regimes, a communism that is implacable in its opposition to anything resembling social democracy.

In September 1981 Mr Leroy was given the task of making the speech for the L'HUMANITE festival. He crystallized the PCF orientation in a witty slogan: "a party in the government but not a government party." The pressure was continuous, to the point that some who supported a renovation of the PCF based on its governmental experience would criticize Mr Marchais for political weakness, which in their view prevented the secretary general from effectively parrying the harsh blows struck by the opponents of participation.

Was it in order to respond to this criticism that Mr Fiterman on 16 May 1982 publicly criticized certain commentaries in the PCF daily on the Malvinas War? Mr Leroy was content merely to let the word out, several days later, that he had not been in the office when the offending commentaries were published.

It seems, then, that the position of the L'HUMANITE editor has not been seriously shaken in the course of the last few years. It certainly seems to have become even stronger since the beginning of the year. It is true that the leadership of the PCF is collegial: it is not necessary to be a member of the secretariat, or even secretary general, to "contribute" to policy-making...

#### Marchais Position

Paris LE MONDE in French 11 Sep 84 p 5

[Text] The line of march for the PCF Central Committee, which meets early next week to lay the groundwork for preparations for the 25th Congress, was spelled out by Mr Georges Marchais during his appearance on the noon news Saturday 8 September on TF-1, broadcast live from the L'HUMANITE festival.\* The secretary

\* The festival was attended by two ministers: Louis Mexandeau (Posts and Telecommunications) and Hubert Curien (Research).

general, who will make the introductory report at the Central Committee meeting, said that the preparatory debates for the congress have been "broad" but "constructive," the aim being to "expand" and "enrich" the strategy adopted by the preceding congresses.

Those who had thought that the results of the European elections (11.28 percent for the PCF) showed the need for a complete revision of PCF policy, which presumably is based on some of the conclusions reached by the congress of February 1982 (the 24th), will come away empty-handed. The message of the party leadership is clear: 1981 was an accident which temporarily blurred the perception of the line followed by the PCF; the congress of reference is the 23rd, which in May 1979 ratified ending the union of the left.

The real issue, Mr Marchais explained, is to "draw the lessons from an experiment that has lasted nearly a quarter of a century" and which led to the abandonment of the policy inspired by the common program after a year of participation in the government.

Such challenges to the "form of union," formerly symbolized by the common program, are not new. It was hard enough to suppress them during the 3 years when the Communists were participating in the government. The Central Committee elected in 1979 had been challenged on those grounds, and it is now clear that the "constructive" speech at the 1982 congress was purely an expedient: something had to be said, one way or another, to justify the June 1981 accord with the socialists.

#### "Comrade Taboo"

In deciding last July not to participate in the government of Mr Laurent Fabius, the Communists took action in accord with the principles which, since 1979, they had never really abandoned. At the same time, those who thought they had enough maneuvering room to try to defend an evolution of the party based on its experience of holding governmental responsibilities found themselves curbed, if not suppressed. The leadership, when challenged, reaffirmed the legitimacy of a proposal--to abandon the union of the left once and for all--to which all the party's current officials had agreed 5 years ago.

Thus, supporters of evolution in the PCF will not have the opportunity to forge a path in the middle ground between condemnation of government decisions and the counter-current, given the party's control over all aspects of policy. Now to hear Mr Roland Leroy speaking on Sunday, these supporters will denounce themselves as instruments of external pressure exerted on the Communist Party. To make things perfectly clear, Mr Marchais said that the position he expressed is that of the party leadership "and the only one," with an implicit allusion to Mr Pierre Juquin, member of the political bureau. The PCF spokesman was also the target of the secretary general's sarcasm when the latter, discussing supporters of discussions "with no taboos" (Mr Juquin's slogan), cited a joke according to which "Comrade Taboo is unhappy because no one wants to have discussions with him."

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\* Mr Marchais is referring to the first steps toward the union of the left in the early 1960's (the legislative elections of 1962 and the presidential elections of 1965).

The new direction taken by the PCF leadership should enable it to avoid the internal debate which seemed inevitable in light of the contradictions that surfaced as a result of its experience in the government and the electoral consequences that ensued. This orientation is also based on a medium-term calculation. By emphasizing that the PCF is no longer in the majority and bears "no responsibility for the administration of the country's affairs," the party leaders are forcing the Socialists first of all to look for new support (those "attempts to find a consensus" which, according to Mr Marchais, the Communists categorically reject), and eventually for other alliances. The time might come for the PCF to try to "become a great force of unity," as Mr Leroy has said, an attempt which might sway some factions within the PSF [French Socialist Party].

This second calculation, more speculative than the first, has for the moment led to a rupture between the PCF and a goodly portion of its supporters, a majority of whom, according to all the polls, favor participation in the government. Fearing what might happen if this rupture broke out into the open, and also intent on avoiding any argument with those favoring a debate, the party leadership ordered the weekly REVOLUTION not to hold any political debates at its stall at the L'HUMANITE festival. Preferring to stick with the authoritative lecture traditionally given on Sunday afternoon, the leadership and Mr Leroy, who delivered the speech, had to endure the disappointment of a smaller than average crowd, a portion of which noisily insisted they had come only to hear the singer, Renaud, not the editor of L'HUMANITE.

The latter announced that 574,561 tickets (for admission to the festival) had been sold, compared to 624,213 the previous year, a decline which is not completely explained by the poor weather, since the tickets had been on sale for weeks prior to the festival.

To overcome the stagnation of the last 3 years, the PCF seems to be temporarily taking leave of its electorate, to whom it plans to communicate, in the months ahead, nothing but its criticisms of the Fabius government's economic and social measures. Such, at least, is the intent of the leadership. Will those who disagree with this direction begin to go public with their complaints?

9516  
CSO: 3519/18

## FIRST FIGARO-SOFRES POLL ON NEW PRIME MINISTER ANALYZED

Paris LE FIGARO in French 19 Sep 84 p 8

[Article by Jean-Dominique Lafay: "The Limits of the 'Fabius Effect'";  
passages enclosed in slantlines, printed in italics]

[Text] In his first FIGARO-SOFRES [French Opinion Polling Company] survey as head of the government L. Fabius obtained the confidence of 53 percent of the voters, whereas P. Mauroy's score in July 1984 was only 25 percent. The socialists are beginning to dream; public opinion could be "on the way to being reconquered." Many people see nothing more in those figures than one more confirmation of the "fickleness of public opinion," that of other people of course. The idea that the ordinary voter is irrational, fluctuating, sensitive to all political manipulations is anchored deeply into our collective subconscious: that of the public, that of politicians and even that of a large number of experts in political analysis. As a matter of fact, we now have at our disposal a large number of empirical works which show that, at least generally, political behavior shows much greater consistency and rationality than one likes to admit. Paradoxically, correctly analyzed and compared with previous changes of prime minister, the "Fabius effect" is an additional confirmation of this.

In France, there are two major indicators of public opinion which are regularly available over a long period of time. The IFOP [French Public Opinion Institute] rating, which has been published since the late fifties (in FRANCE-SOIR, and then in the JOURNAL DU DIMANCHE) and the FIGARO-SOFRES survey, since the mid-seventies. In the case of L. Fabius, these two indicators did not react totally the same way. Table 1 shows that:

- F. Mitterrand did not increase his own popularity by replacing P. Mauroy, whether in terms of /satisfaction/ (measured by the IFOP rating) or of /confidence/ (measured by the FIGARO-SOFRES survey).
- The new government is not judged a priori more effective than the previous one, at least not as far as the available indicators (fight against unemployment and fight against inflation) are concerned. The contrary would rather seem to be the case.
- The number of people /satisfied/ with L. Fabius (32 percent) has gone up compared to P. Mauroy (25 percent) and reached a level virtually equal to that

of the president of the republic (33 percent). This phenomenon is very logical given that the new prime minister is presented as close to Francois Mitterrand.

- The number of individuals having confidence in the new prime minister has gone up to 53 percent, as against 25 percent for P. Mauroy 2 months earlier. If you can talk of a Fabius effect, it is at this level that it is found. Never before has the gap between /confidence/ (FIGARO-SOFRES rating) and /satisfaction/ (IFOP rating) been so great. There is nothing to say whether this phenomenon is exceptional or not; as a matter of fact, this is the first time that it has been possible to measure the gap between the two ratings at the time of a change of prime ministers (in the course of the 7 year term).

Table 1: IFOP and FIGARO-SOFRES Ratings at the Time of the Change of Prime Minister

|  | July 1984                   | September<br>1984           |
|--|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|
|  | P. Mauroy<br>prime minister | L. Fabius<br>prime minister |
| % of people /satisfied/ with the president of the republic (IFOP)          | 33                          | 33                          |
| % of people having /confidence/ in the president of the republic (SOFRES)  | 40                          | 40                          |
| % of people /satisfied/ with prime minister (IFOP)                         | 25                          | 32                          |
| % of people having /confidence/ in prime minister (SOFRES)                 | 25                          | 53                          |
| % of people who feel that fight against unemployment is effective (SOFRES) | 12                          | 11                          |
| % of people having /confidence/ in the president of the republic (SOFRES)  | 22                          | 18                          |

#### Precedents Under Fifth Republic

The preceding phenomenon is rather easy to explain: statistically speaking, the French are less partisan than they are believed to be. As the "objective" situation is always the same, they have no reason at all to express more or less /satisfaction/. At the most one could figure approximately 7 percent (32 percent minus 25 percent). The wearing away of P. Mauroy's strictly personal popularity. On the other hand, a not inconsiderable part of public opinion seems disposed to give the new prime minister "his chance," hence the high /confidence/ rating. Past experiences show that this blank check has been normal during the Fifth Republic. However, it is usually short-lived, 3 or 4 months, and the initial personal credit quickly melts away.

Table 2: Popularity Ratings at the Time of Changes of Prime Ministers during the 7 Year Term and Corresponding Ratings for the President of the Republic.

|  | Premier ministre (1) |            |              | Président de la République(2) |            |              |
|--|----------------------|------------|--------------|-------------------------------|------------|--------------|
|  | (3) Satisfaits       | Mécontents | Sans opinion | Satisfaits                    | Mécontents | Sans opinion |
| M. Debré (6)<br>(Mvrier à avril 1962) .....                  | 31,5                 | 45         | 23,5         | 61,5                          | 28,5       | 10           |
| G. Pompidou (7)<br>(mai à juillet 1962) .....                | 28,5                 | 20,5       | 51           | 60                            | 27         | 13           |
| G. Pompidou (8)<br>(avril à juin 1968) .....                 | 46                   | 34         | 20           | 56                            | 30,3       | 13,7         |
| M. Couve de Murville (9)<br>(juillet à septembre 1968) ..... | 48,7                 | 17,7       | 35,7         | 57,3                          | 31         | 11,7         |
| J. Chaban-Delmas (10)<br>(avril à juin 1972) .....           | 51                   | 30         | 19           | 56,7                          | 28         | 15,3         |
| P. Messmer (11)<br>(juillet à septembre 1972) .....          | 30                   | 13,7       | 56,3         | 55,5                          | 26         | 18,5         |
| J. Chirac (12)<br>(juin à août 1976) .....                   | 42,7                 | 42,3       | 15           | 52                            | 38,7       | 11,3         |
| R. Barre (13)<br>(septembre à nov. 1976) .....               | 23,3                 | 32         | 44,7         | 44                            | 43,7       | 12,3         |
| P. Mauroy (14)<br>(mai à juillet 1984) .....                 | 25,7                 | 54,7       | 17,7         | 32                            | 53         | 15           |
| L. Fabius (15)<br>(août et septembre 1984) .....             | 30,5                 | 15,5       | 54           | 32,5                          | 52,5       | 15           |

Note: The figures correspond to percentages of satisfied, dissatisfied and no opinion over an average period of 3 months (IFOP data). In the case of L. Fabius, the averages only cover 2 months (August and September 1984).

Key:

1. Prime minister
2. President of the republic
3. Satisfied
4. Dissatisfied
5. No opinion
6. M. Debré (February to April 1962)
7. G. Pompidou (May to July 1962)
8. G. Pompidou (April to June 1968)
9. M. Couve de Murville (July to September 1968)
10. J. Chaban-Delmas (April to June 1972)
11. P. Messmer (July to September 1976)
12. J. Chirac (June to August 1976)
13. R. Barre (September to November 1976)
14. P. Mauroy (May to July 1984)
15. L. Fabius (August and September 1984)

The Fifth Republic has had two kinds of prime ministers: those who came into power at the same time as the president and those whose appointment took place in the course of the 7 year term (G. Pompidou in 1962, M. Couve de Murville in 1968, Pierre Messmer in 1972, and Raymond Barre in 1976). In the case of Laurent Fabius, it is of course those from the second category above who are important.

Table 2 compares the average popularity for the three first months of their mandate of prime ministers who were appointed in the course of 7 year terms with that of their respective predecessors over the previous 3 months. The same calculation (3 months before, 3 months after) was carried out for the president of the republic in power at that time. This table is extremely revealing: the decision to change prime ministers has never had a short term positive influence on the popularity of the president of the republic. In the case of Valery Giscard d'Estaing there was even a substantial drop in average satisfaction: financial stabilization measures such as those which followed Raymond Barre's appointment are rarely very popular. On the other hand, a very clear change in the popularity of the new prime ministers can be seen: there is a strong drop in the percentage of individuals who are dissatisfied and a substantial increase in the number of people with "no opinion." Prime ministers who are sufficiently well known by public opinion prior to their appointment (M. Couve de Murville, Laurent Fabius) enjoy a level of satisfaction comparable to that of their respective predecessors. The others (Georges Pompidou, Pierre Messmer, and especially Raymond Barre) had a tendency to accumulate an abnormally high percentage of "no opinion" responses. However, the essential result of Table 2 -- which is common to all prime ministers -- is the pronounced drop in the number of people who are /dissatisfied/. It would seem that each time the French are good losers and always give the new occupants of the Hotel Matignon a not insignificant credit. Generally speaking, this "honeymoon," in terms of those who are dissatisfied, does not last more than 3 or 4 months. A study of the figures shows that one finds more stable levels after that, as the majority of those who were temporarily of "no opinion" return to their initial dissatisfaction. Like most spectacular political decisions, changes in prime ministers do not seem to alter behavior on a long term basis. The electorate seems to ask for more tangible results. Hence, it will take about a year before it is possible to really know whether there was a "Fabius effect" or not. For now, we will have to content ourselves with noting one more time the rationality of the French electorate and the consistency of its modes of behavior.

8463  
CSO: 3519/3

## PCF POSITION ANALYZED AFTER CENTRAL COMMITTEE REPORT

Paris LIBERATION in French 21 Sep 84 p 7

[Article by Eric Dupin: "PCF No Longer Knows What Strategy to Commit Itself To"]

[Text] The party has abandoned the Left union without being able to replace it with a credible strategy. Its leaders admit to having been "led astray" while claiming to be right all the time. But the Marchais report has been endorsed by almost all the members of the Central Committee.

The PCF [French Communist Party] no longer has any political future to offer. Meeting on the 17-19 September, the Central Committee charged the strategy of the Left union with having plunged the Communists into the election disaster we are familiar with. The party has for an unspecified period of time given up attempts to reach a new agreement with the PS [Socialist Party]. Less spectacular than in 1977, the 1984 break is assuming a more fundamental dimension. The Communists are no longer demanding, as they did then, that their allies return to the unit contract (the joint program), which they have supposedly violated. From now on they will clearly object to any PS-PCF summit alliance in which the self-proclaimed party of the working class does not exercise leadership. In so doing, Communist leaders are totally voiding the affirmation that they remain "attached" to the Left union of its meaning. This strategy is in reality being indefinitely postponed.

We are compelled to assert that the PCF is powerless to replace the strategy it is abandoning with a new one.

The theme of the "popular majority rally" about the Communists comes under the heading of a slogan. At best it may permit the PCF to capitalize to its advantage on the dissatisfaction of victims of the crisis and to exploit the bitternesses the government's policy is giving rise to in the Left. In presenting itself as the party whose sole ambition is to help the workers to resolve their problems "case by case" and "at the bottom," the PCF sets itself outside the political arena. We are witness to a curious sort of "CGT-ization" [CGT = General Confederation of Labor] of the PCF. It is not the examples of Creusot-Loire and Seyne-sur-Mer, cited yesterday as examples by Paul Laurent

on French Television Channel 1, that may convince people of the reality of this celebrated "anticrisis rally," the "premises" of which that leader nevertheless sees.

The Communist leadership's current attitude calls for another questioning session. "For some 15 or 20 years we have been leading ourselves astray on the problem of coalition," Laurent asserted. How can this self-criticism be compatible with the reaffirmation of the fundamental soundness of the issues developed during the last three congresses? The leadership has "led itself astray" on an essential issue and at the same time it claims "to be confirming and going more deeply into" the line specified beginning with the 22d congress. Another contradiction: The PCF spits on a Left union at the summit, but declares itself ready to continue to take advantage of "cooperation" with the Socialists at the level of the local communities.

Only one Central Committee member (Felix Damette) out of 146 had the courage to refuse to endorse an orientation that is far from benefiting from the heartfelt assent of all Communists. Rallying behind Marchais' report at the last minute, Pierre Juquin and Claude Poperen did not even voice an opinion before the Central Committee. In the face of the most sectarian of Communist attacks, the ~~renewers~~ confined themselves to a timid defense. By rejoining the ranks, some of the renewers hope to save their skins. It is, however, far from certain that the witch hunt against the "liquidators" will not take place. As of now, the most liberal PCF leaders have been eliminated from the committee charged with drafting the congress resolution. Eight Politburo members will participate in this, but this is not the case for Pierre Juquin, Claude Poperen, Francette Lazard, Mireille Bertrand or even Guy Hermier. Of course, Roland Leroy will be included.

11,466  
CSO: 3519/1

## CURRENT PCF CRISIS COMPARED TO THAT OF 1978

Paris LIBERATION in French 21 Sep 84 p 8

[Article by Eric Dupin: "PCF: Three Months to Put Down the Renewers"]

[Text] Following the shock of 17 June, those who would renew the party, who are everywhere, right up to the Politburo level, are hoping for the opening of a fundamental debate on the reasons for the Communist decline. But, thanks to skillful maneuvers, the conservatives, with Georges Marchais at their head, have quickly regained control.

What is the difference between the PCF [French Communist Party] crisis of 1978 and that of 1984? "Six years ago they told our permanent comrades: You shut your mouth or it's the ANPE [National Employment Agency] for you! Today, they can tell them: You open your mouth or it's the ANPE for you!" This jest illustrates the state of euphoria many Communists who would renew the party were in at the end of June. The knockout blow of 11 percent of the European election shook the party to its roots. The anguish of irreversible marginalization of the PCF drove people, right up to and including certain members of the Politburo, to take the bull by the horns and speak out. The drive for renewal quickly subsided. Georges Marchais and the ruling clique made the PCF swallow the violent Euroshock of 17 June. Served by the evolution of the political context, they also displayed undeniable maneuvering skill.

Yet Marchais was at death's door. It is an understatement to say that he was beaten by his ex-equal along with Jean-Marie Le Pen. A blow that was all the more painful since the secretary general of the PCF was without too many apprehensions waiting for the voters' verdict. A week before election day he even foresaw the possibility of an increase in the number of Communist ministers (interview with LIBERATION). The party leadership speculated on an internal rebalancing of the Left in its favor: A PCF with a support figure in the neighborhood of 15 percent would have carried more weight in the face of a PS [Socialist Party] reduced to about 20 percent.

His downfall was harder to take. At the time Marchais went into silent withdrawal for 10 days. But as of the evening of the 17 June, the party leadership attributed the defeat of the Left and the PCF to "dissatisfaction" with the government. Those leaders who issued statements on the day after the election

did not, however, try to minimize the importance of their election results. L'HUMANITE announced an examination of conscience "without complacency" and Pierre Juquin swore that his party would not pursue "an ostrich-like policy." The spokesman for the Politburo went even further, citing the Italian Communist Party as an example.

#### June: Mouths Are Opening

Meeting on Tuesday, 19 June, the Politburo proceeded to an "initial examination of the situation." Its explanation of the election defeat was focused on the government's shortcomings, but party leaders appealed to Communists to engage in "open and rigorous discussion, not dodging any problem."

That is when many mouths opened. "We're cut off from everything that moves," a leader who is for renewal and hopes the PCF will adopt "a more moderate, less extremist style" confided to us. In Marchais' case the allusion is transparent. There were many Communists who called for Comrade 11-Percent's retirement. On 20 June Anicet Le Pors publicly demanded that his party question itself about its "line," its organization, which is not fixed once and for all time," and that it not be afraid of launching a "debate on party personalities, one excluding no one."

But Roland Leroy already had his eye open for the danger of orthodoxy. On 21 June he presented an asceptic version of the internal debate and announced that Marchais would stay where he was, since, as in previous years, he would participate in the program French Television Channel 1 dedicates to the "L'HUMANITE Festival." Leroy even went so far as to express the opinion that the 17 June had not produced evidence of "a new political landscape," contrary to what Guy Hermier had written at the same time. The difference in analysis between the renewers and the conservatives is, moreover, strikingly expressed in the difference in tone between REVOLUTION and L'HUMANITE.

A meeting of the Central Committee was called for 26 and 27 June. It was Claude Poperen, a leader who is fairly liberal but had until then remained in the background, who was charged with presenting the report in the name of the Politburo. The members of that governing body found it very hard to agree on the wording. Following several meetings, the Politburo's conservative majority forced Poperen to assume the authorship before the Central Committee of a text that owes very little to his pen and with which he personally disagrees.

In fact on 26 June Poperen presented to the party's "parliament" a report that resolutely removed all the basic issues the crisis the PCF is undergoing and its decline pose. Everything was traced back to the damage caused by government action and the negative effects of the party's participation in the Cabinet. And there was an instant outcry.

While the silent majority of party administration supporters remained silent, discussants followed one another before the Central Committee to underline the inadequacies of the report attributed to Poperen. This protest was the work of intellectuals like philosopher Lucien Seve, veteran Communists like Marie-Claude Vaillant-Couturier and several federal officials like Alain Amacabile (Meurthe-et-Moselle) or Francois Asensi (Seine-Saint Denis).

Surprised by the magnitude of the protest, the administration opted for a tactical withdrawal. Putting Poporan's report to a vote would probably have produced a minority of about 30 Central Committee members. Guy Hermier and Paul Laurent were also charged with drafting the text of a resolution that added to the administrations' points a statement of the basic issues (changes in the society, party operation, etc.) the Communists ought to discuss. The Central Committee was then able to unanimously vote for a statement that its members had "discussed" the Poporan report, modestly presented as "the Politburo's initial reflections."

The renewers then had the feeling they had scored an important point. The Poporan report was, however, published and, although it was not voted on, it was to be practically applied. As of 28 June, moreover, Georges Marchais reappeared on television to button up the debate.

He affirmed his faith in "democratic centralism," the current forms of which had been criticized before the Central Committee. A scathing refutation of Pierre Juquin, who a few days before had declared that it was "possible" for the PCF to modify its internal operation. The secretary general appeared to be determined to retain his position. He knew he could only do so by allying himself with the conservatives, who had everything to fear from the opening of a real internal debate.

#### July: Renewers at Odds with One Another

His counteroffensive was to be greatly facilitated by the political events of the summer. The administration thought that the divorce of the Left would take place in the fall. Quite determined not to swallow the 1985 budget, it was prepared to have its ministers walk out on that occasion. But with the announcement of the referendum and then Pierre Mauroy's resignation, Francois Mitterrand hastened the moment of decision. It was impossible for the Communist administration to return to the Fabius government with the prospect of leaving it a few months later. The decision to leave the government was quickly reached. So much so that Gaston Plissonnier could explain that Georges Marchais, who had hurriedly returned from Bulgaria where he was spending his vacation, had immediately given his consent to the analysis that led to the break.

This time, when the Central Committee met on the night of 18-19 July, the renewers were given short notice. A few hours before one of the Communist ministers in private had said that he was convinced that the PCF would not opt for a break.

Furthermore, the renewers were themselves divided on the question of participation. Some of them, like Anicet Le Pors and Marcel Rigout, were in favor of remaining in the government, while others felt that a disengagement by the PCF was inevitable, considering the evolution of government policy and Mitterrand's "re-Centering." Thus the option of leaving was opposed by a small minority of participants in the discussion, particularly by the two above-mentioned ministers. And the text of the resolution was finally unanimously adopted by the members of the Central Committee.

## August: Conservatives' Offensive

Since then, the conservatives have resolutely taken the offensive. Backed by Roland Leroy and Gaston Plissonnier, Marchais is quite determined to succeed himself at the 25th congress, scheduled for early February 1985. They have begun to unleash an internal campaign against the renewers, accused of having created an "organized liquidator faction" inside the party. In fact, attempts at isolating certain federal officials who were exposed have been undertaken.

Charged, suspected of "factionalism," the renewers chose to remain silent while waiting for the September Central Committee meeting. Juquin limited himself to a statement, quickly denied by Leroy, that the PCF cannot be "elsewhere than in the majority." The director of L'HUMANITE became the real spokesman for the Politburo. It was he who, in reaction to Laurent Fabius' telecast, on 6 September announced that the Communists are no longer part of the majority.

At the 8-9 September L'HUMANITE celebration Leroy and Marchais drove the nail of the break all the way in and placed the PCF clearly in the opposition. The secretary general limited the subject of internal debate to "the thorough examination" of the strategy defined at the 22d, 23d and 24th congresses. Gaston Plissonnier also voted to challenge an alliance of a "quarter of a century" with the Socialists.

Within this context the renewers are gambling on a reaction from the members of the Central Committee, who are worried about the administration's sectarian drift and do not want to see the fundamental debate announced in June strangled. They scarcely have any illusions as to their chances of reversing the trend, but hope that there are enough of them for their warnings not to be the acts of just a few individuals.

On Tuesday, 11 September, Marchais presented a first version of his report to the Politburo. The lengthy discussion that followed it exhibited differences within the Politburo. Pierre Juquin and Claude Popere abstained because of the wording. But Marchais then presented a slightly modified text that rounded off the sharp edges a bit and obtained the support of those two members of the Politburo. The renewers had given up fighting for their ideas.

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CSO: 3519/1

BRIEFS

RIGOUT ON LEFT UNION—"There has been no breakup of the Left union; that's a misinterpretation of Georges Marchais' statements," former Minister of Vocational Training Marcel Rigout asserted Thursday evening in Limoges during a "Face the Press" organized by the editorial staff of FR 3-Limousin. Rigout, who specifically stated that prompt actions could be undertaken with the PS [Socialist Party], explained that "the PCF has learned its lesson from the experience of an agreement between general staffs that has not worked and it has thrown itself into the search for a new popular and democratic rally." Speaking of the government's actions, he declared: "Since 1982 we have been witness to the inflexibility of the policy pursued by Pierre Mauroy since the start of his mandate. Unemployment has not remained the chief priority at this time when employment problems are at the heart of French families' worries." With regard to the reasons behind the "historic decline of the PCF," Rigout stated that, when his party had four ministers in the government, "the workers found themselves in a delicate position and had delegated too much of their powers to their representatives, forgetting that their struggle was indispensable to combat the forces of the opposition." "The same holds true for the Socialist activists," he added. [Text] [Paris LIBERATION in French 21 Sep 84 p 48] 11466

JOXE ON ELECTORAL DISTRICTS—Minister of Interior and Decentralization Pierre Joxe stated on Thursday in Colmar that he would not create "the total number of 714 cantons" planned by his predecessor, Gaston Deferre, and warned "those who are starting to talk of butchery." Referring for the first time to the revision of the canton map before the congress of Department Council Chairmen, Joxe asserted: "None will be created in some 30 departments and about 40 at least will have no more than three of them." "It is especially," he indicated, "those departments that have experienced a sizable increase in population, either through growth or mobility, that will be subject to somewhat more extensive slicing up." "Practically speaking, this means that those very rare eliminations of cantons should only take place where there is no longer any real reason for it to exist, where it no longer provides public services or where there is no longer any local life. Everywhere else," the minister declared, "it would be harmful, unacceptable and misunderstood to eliminate those cantons that are a reality." [Text] [Paris LIBERATION in French 21 Sep 84 p 48] 11466

CSO: 3519/1

## U.S. WARNING REPORTEDLY FACTOR IN ELECTIONS DECISION

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 16-17 Sep 84 pp 1, 3

[Commentary by Nik Emm Simos: "Washington Asks the Greek Government for 'Good Allied Behavior,' Criticizes Our Country for Its Pro-Soviet Attitude. Harder Line Seen After the Election"]

[Text] It appears that the satisfaction of certain essential U.S. demands, which for obvious reasons are not being made public, has not cancelled out the "damage" the present government's broader foreign policy has done to Greek-U.S. relations. This is the conclusion that emerges from the reporting provided the Greek Government by its ambassador in Washington, G. Papoulias. From this, it appears that the United States will take a harder line with Greece after the U.S. elections at the end of this year. At that time, there will no longer be any need for "special handling" of the Greek-American community by Washington.

This U.S. stance could be interpreted superficially as indirect blackmail of the Greek Government to secure a policy of "total subordination" and "absolute allied obedience." However, what has provoked this U.S. reserve, which also showed up in U.S. Assistant Secretary of State R. Burt's statements (which were described as provocative) is Washington's inability to understand the government's behavior. On the one hand it agrees to the most essential U.S. requests in connection with its operational capabilities in the region. On the other hand, with the stands it takes internationally the Greek Government--ally though it is--attempts "from force of habit" to damage U.S. prestige. And this at a time of ideological confrontation with the eastern bloc, when the indisputable Soviet superiority in intermediate range strategic nuclear systems and conventional arms constitutes the basic U.S. argument for forcing the USSR into a dialog to reduce armaments. Diplomatic circles observe that of course Washington cannot understand the domestic expediency of Greece's pro-Soviet policy, which makes all the Western governments distrustful, while at the same time the Greek Government consents to the installation of new American telecommunications equipment that impressively multiplies the operational strength and capability of a certain base on Greek soil.

Thus, political observers argue that the prospect of a harder U.S. line after the U.S. presidential elections was yet another element that the prime minister

considered in the sum of judgments he made in reaching the major decision not to hold early elections in November. This was because PASOK's campaign effort to win over votes on the left would have had as a long-term result a U.S. policy even harder than rumors now have it. This would have come at a time when (a) the Cyprus problem is moving a bit and needs U.S. support to push some solution through; (b) Greek-Turkish relations, though somewhat relaxed, are still bogged down and the tension between the countries could easily flare up again; and (c) the Greek case is still pending at NATO, and--given Turkey's interference--cannot be settled without Washington's intervention.

There is then much unfinished business to be considered, as well as the possible consequences of an outburst of campaign-induced anti-Americanism in Greece. In this light, and to the degree that Greek-U.S. relations must be dealt with on a realistic basis, there is a special significance to statements by U.S. Government spokesmen that they hope that "the Greek Government's behavior will not compel the U.S. Government to review relations between the United States and Greece." The significance of these statements takes on yet another dimension when we remember that it is not just the U.S. Government that has every reason to wish to maintain a delicate balance in its policy toward Greece and Turkey, bearing in mind its broader interests in the region. Even U.S. officials who are proven friends of Greece, such as E. Derwinski and Van Dusen, have argued that the Greek Government's behavior is daily making it more difficult for congressmen who wish to support the Greek positions, because there is growing opposition to Greece in their home districts from the voters themselves.

From the above it now appears to be the responsibility of the Greek Government to make use of the possibilities offered it by the pressure on the United States. These possibilities, however, are also linked with the sort of "good allied behavior" shown toward the United States. This behavior, diplomatic observers point out, does not of necessity presuppose blind obedience, which would put national interests at the mercy of the goals of U.S. foreign policy. Rather it would accord with the principles of mutual rights and obligations that healthy alliances require.

No U.S. intransigence was apparent in the first talks of the Joint Greek-U.S. Commission set up to review the various Greek-U.S. agreements and to negotiate unsettled issues from the recently signed Greek-U.S. treaty (these talks resumed last Friday). Nor was there any U.S. intransigence in the talks on the Voice of America. Hence, whether or not the projected U.S. hardening comes true after the presidential elections depends to a large extent on how realistically the Greek Government handles Greek-U.S. relations in the future and on whether it "mortgages" an important alliance for the expediency of party goals.

12593  
CSO: 3521/363

## NO POSTPONEMENT OF FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT TO ALBANIA

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 18 Sep 84 p 1

[Article: "Papoulias To Visit Albania in October Despite the Murder of the Rural Policeman; Northern Ipeiros Issue Not To Be Discussed"]

[Text] Alternate Minister of Foreign Affairs Karolos Papoulias's visit to Albania will not be postponed because of the incident on the Greek-Albanian border in which rural policeman Pavlos Lolis was murdered by an Albanian patrol. Government spokesman D. Maroudas made this announcement yesterday.

Papoulias is expected to visit Albania in October; the exact date has not yet been set. According to the government spokesman's statement yesterday, "preparations are being made to sign various agreements between the two countries."

Well-informed sources explained that these agreements will deal with telecommunications, transportation, water use in the areas along the border, the exchange of television programs, etc.

#### The Greeks of Northern Ipeiros

An absolutely reliable source noted that during Papoulias's visit the Albanian Government is not willing to discuss either the issue of ending the state of war or the minority question. The same source stressed that during his visit to Athens at the end of June, Albanian Deputy Foreign Minister (Moamet Kaplan) explained to Papoulias that:

1. Ending the state of war is a Greek internal affair and consequently cannot be the subject of discussion.
2. The Greek minority secured its rights in the national liberation struggle, is not discriminated against and has no need of support from outside. Hence the minority question, too, cannot be the subject of discussion between the two delegations.

Additionally, according to a Foreign Ministry communique, yesterday at 11:20 am Papoulias "summoned to the Foreign Ministry the ambassador of Albania in Athens, Ksenofon Nushi, and made a demarche to him, asking for explanations in the death of Greek rural policeman Pavlos Lolis."

The same communique adds that "the Albanian ambassador told Papoulias that he is truly sorry about this deplorable incident. Furthermore, the Foreign Ministry of Albania also communicated this to our ambassador in Tirana." A spokesman for the Albanian Embassy in Athens also made similar statements. When asked, he added that "incidents of this nature do not contribute to the strengthening of relations between the two peoples."

#### Circumstances of the Murder

The circumstances surrounding the death of rural policeman Pavlos Lolis had not been cleared up as of last night. According to testimony from the three Ipeiros who were hunting with him on Saturday morning, Lolis was murdered in cold blood by the Albanian soldiers.

It is definitely known that the Albanians claim that Lolis refused to identify himself and quarreled with the guards, who killed him in a moment of panic.

Whatever the truth about the border incident, authoritative observers note that the Albanian guards behaved in an unforgivable nervous manner during the whole affair. This was primarily due to the fact that large numbers of Albanians of Greek descent flee to Greece illegally. On the day of the incident, for instance, four Albanian citizens crossed the border and asked for asylum from Greek authorities.

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## BRIEFS

REPORTED ND ADVANCES TO EPEN--We hear that the talks between the ND leadership and the Papadopoulos-ite EPEN [National Political Union] are moving ahead. The subject of the discussions is pure and simple: if K. Mitsotakis's ND will put EPEN people on its ticket in the next elections, then Papadopoulos's friends will be happy to dissolve their "party".... From what they say behind the scenes at ND, things are moving toward a solution of the "problem." You will recall that under E. Averof similar negotiations--for the Euro-elections--came to nothing. The junta people asked for too much, and the then ND leader... did not dare. Will his successor dare now? We will wait and see.... [Text] [Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 10 Sep 84 p 8] 12593

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**SARAIVA DE CARVALHO'S IMPRISONMENT SEEN JUSTIFIED**

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 8 Sep 84 p 6

[Excerpts] As EXPRESSO stated in this column a week ago, no citizen should be considered guilty until tried by the courts. Our column a week ago referred specifically to Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho.

For those who always believed in Otelo's innocence, certain reports circulating about the seizure in the house of the former leader of the [25] April [movement] of apparently compromising information are upsetting. At least one thing is certain: although one month ago there were many people convinced that the arrest of Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho was merely a political move made for some undisclosed reasons, now, following the reports published in the press, everyone is confronted with the truth, bitter to some, that there are facts which may not prove Otelo's guilt but which at least justify the investigations into his activities.

The truth is this: whether or not political maneuvering is involved, Otelo's imprisonment is supported by serious suspicions.

It has been said with some disillusionment that the imprisonment of the leader of 25 April symbolically represents the end of the hopes of those who ten years ago believed that it was possible to have greater justice in Portugal.

This idea is particularly popular among the Leftists, but it is also being discussed by the Right.

For the Left, the imprisonment of Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho is proof that the country has gone back to former times, and that the group in power is reactionary and vindictive. For the Right, the imprisonment of Otelo and his potential guilt represents the final proof that 25 April was the product of a group of officers without scruples or principles.

It is safe to say that both conclusions are rash, if not ill-intended.

In the first place, the imprisonment of Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho is not so unusual or even surprising, in the light of his background. In reality, the normal fate of revolutions is that they swallow the people who make them.

In the second place, it is a fact that Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, whether innocent or guilty, whether he conspired or not, was not satisfied with the regime he helped to create. But what does this prove? That the regime is wrong? It would be ridiculous to draw this conclusion, because it would imply acceptance of the principle that authors of revolutions are entitled to use power as they wish and to do with a country what they want. This obviously is not defensible

Isn't this regime the one Captain Otelo had in mind when he started the revolution? So much the worse. You will recall that what legitimized the April 25, 1974 revolution more than anything was precisely the fact that its purpose was to give back to the Portuguese people the possibility of choosing the form of government they wanted--and not, according to the revolutionary soldiers themselves, the type of government that one of them may have in mind.

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## ADMIRATION FOR SAVIMBI NO OBSTACLE TO RELATIONS WITH ANGOLA

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 13 Sep 84 pp 1, 2

[Excerpts] Last Saturday our esteemed colleagues at EXPRESSO, a weekly magazine published in Lisbon, reported that UNITA President Jonas Savimbi devoted an important part of his speech in the Angolan jungles to TEMPO and the author of this editorial column. Jonas Savimbi, a great African leader, criticized us for saying that the government was right to have stopped a report on UNITA by journalist Brata Feye, whose professional competence we greatly admire. We do not know exactly what Savimbi said, but we gather that he was upset over TEMPO's position on this issue. We know Jonas Savimbi personally. He is one of the greatest African leaders of our day, intelligent, courageous, self-assured, capable of clear political analysis and a well-defined strategy, and a man of peace, not a man of war.

Later we met other UNITA leaders, such as Wilson dos Santos. They all told us how much they appreciated the role that TEMPO was playing, as an information agent, in improving relations between Portugal and its former overseas territories. We do not have on our conscience the weight of having at some time unfairly criticized any of the Portuguese-speaking African nations. We have friendly ties with Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe, Angola and Mozambique, as we do with any other Portuguese country. As we do with Brazil, for instance. Obviously we cannot side with the MPLA in Angola, for the simple reason that it is a Marxist party, subject to Moscow's imperialism and the will and interests of Fidel Castro, both enemies of a free society which we are fortunate to enjoy in Portugal.

We look with friendship and respect on those who, like us, love freedom and respect human rights. There was once some distrust, but now there does not appear to be any doubt that Samora Machel, president of Mozambique, is a great friend of Portugal and the Portuguese people. He is another man who is beginning to understand the virtues and moral greatness of the West, and of our nation. We note that there is a healthy desire for neutrality and respect for Portugal in Cape Verde. And, we note that Guinea Bissau has confidence in our serious proposals for cooperation. In our opinion, Jonas Savimbi should be the president of Angola today. We regard him as a friend, capable of respecting our people and cooperating to defend our mutual interests. We are told that Savimbi's group is more racist than Luanda's MPLA Marxist group. Portugal has never feared racism, for the simple reason

that the Portuguese people have never practiced racism and have always shown themselves to be a friendly people, capable of living with, understanding and loving all ethnic groups. We are, however, afraid of the political racism of the people in Angola who are doing everything they can to poison our relations, to the point of threatening the Lisbon government with the withdrawal of the Angolan ambassador to our capital.

Although we do not believe that some day we will be able to establish a relationship of trust with the MPLS Marxist party, we do believe we can do so with the Angolan people. And we know that even within the MPLA, there are leaders who are loyal friends of Portugal and who are waiting for the right time to overthrow the government that came to power to liberate Angola from foreign domination. For all these reasons, and because we defend respect between nations, we are in favor of permanent diplomatic relations at the highest level between Lisbon and Luanda. The Luanda government, although Marxist, is legitimate, and it represents the nation. Savimbi is a contender, but he is not the government.

It is therefore appropriate that the Portuguese government deal with the Luanda government, and not with Jonas Savimbi, although he deserves our friendship as a great freedom fighter and a great Angolan leader, who speaks our language and admires our culture. Whether you like it or not, Savimbi will be the great leader of Angola, unless the treacheries of war should annihilate him before he reaches Luanda.

But despite this admiration for Savimbi, and for his struggle and suffering, a TV station or newspaper should not confuse him with the government.

The Portuguese government should be in contact with the Angolan government, and this is represented by Eduardo dos Santos.

Portugal is a country undergoing a difficult economic situation and hardships, and it has preferential relations with Angola as its major buyer. In 1983, Portuguese exports to Angola amounted to 11.1 thousand contos, and imports only 1.6. A responsible government cannot ignore the nation's interests. And, when a nation sees itself threatened, albeit unjustly, the government has the obligation to defend its interests above all else. A break in relations between Angola and Portugal would have serious implications for a large percentage of Portuguese exports. The ban of the Barata Feyo program on the RTP [Portuguese Radio and Television] was designed to defend the state and prevent more sacrifices on the part of the Portuguese and Angolan people. In time, the program may be broadcast, without causing the emotional fervor it now has, which would be dangerous.

Despite Jonas Savimbi's criticism of us in the inhospitable African countryside where he is waging his battles that will crown him with glory, we still maintain our previous position. The television program on UNITA should not be broadcast before a clear explanation is made to the Luanda government, so that they understand that information in Portugal is unrestricted, as we live in a free society. From afar, we view with sorrow the war between

UNITA and the MPLA. We unfortunately do not share some people's optimism that Savimbi will one day reach an understanding with the MPLA Marxists. The Marxists have never reached an understanding with anyone throughout history. Unfortunately, Savimbi is going to have to fight up to the gates of Luanda. No peace is possible with the Marxists. The Portuguese government, representing the people, cannot, however, get involved in any war, nor can it take sides.

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## DIFFICULTIES ARISE IN RELATIONS WITH ANGOLA

## Difficulties Regretted

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 13 Sep 84 p 6

[Text] Unlike relations with Mozambique, there is no doubt that relations between Portugal and Angola are going through bad times. There is an obvious tension between the two governments, and the distance, indeed the chill with which the Luanda regime views our partnership with the Maputo regime is clear.

It takes a great deal of good will not to view President Jose Eduardo dos Santos' failure to include Lisbon in his rounds of various European capitals as intentional. And, it cannot be regarded as irrelevant, either. That it is not, and the Portuguese government naturally realizes this.

Moreover, the excuse given by the prime minister to justify the omission, namely that the visit of an Angolan head of state to Portugal is "different from visits to other European countries"--insinuating that it deserves separate treatment and a separate schedule--is not valid. We need only recall the visit by Samora Michel as part of his European tour, which the Mozambican president paid on the same basis as for other countries, but which was no less significant, important or successful because of that.

Whatever may be, it is evident that things are not going very well between Luanda and Lisbon. Is it our fault? Or Angola's fault? Or is it the fault of "bad advisors and agents involved in political intrigue," as Prime Minister Mario Soares intimated?

When the Angolan President spoke to journalists at the press conference concluding his trip to Paris, he acknowledged that the political relations between his country and Portugal were undergoing some difficulties because of certain positions of the Lisbon Government which he termed "unfair." He made an exception, however, of economic relations, which he described as "correct."

It is thus in the political field that the dispute lies and that is the source of the latent uneasiness. And this immediately brings to mind the question of the alleged "sympathy" with which the Portuguese authorities regard UNITA's activities, in the eyes of the Luanda authorities. Without making

any specific reference, Jose Eduardo dos Santos implied it when he once again complained of certain "unfair positions" taken by us with regard to his regime.

It is true that, unlike what is happening with the Mozambican anti-government guerrilla movement, UNITA is a political movement which started in Angola prior to its own independence. It took part in the conversations leading to the Alvor agreements in 1975, and it is organized on an international scale. You will recall that the movement has a delegation operating in Paris--and that did not prevent the Angolan President from stopping there.

Regardless of whether you view the struggle it has undertaken and is waging against the Luanda regime as legitimate, you cannot ignore the fact that this struggle exists. Nor, with the free press characteristic of a democratic regime such as ours, can you help but be aware of the factors behind UNITA's activities.

Aside from this perfectly clear situation, one must finally consider the mutual respect with which sovereign and independent countries such as Portugal and the People's Republic of Angola coexist, without political interference by either side, and with many common links, such as the language and the ties generated by a friendship that goes back centuries and that really brings them together. Thus we do not think that it will be too difficult for Luanda and Lisbon to settle the differences that have arisen. As President Jose Eduardo dos Santos himself has just said, in the economic field and all other sectors, Luso-Angolan relations are perfectly correct. This would only of course be to the advantage and benefit of both nations and their people.

#### Responsibility Attributed to Angola

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 13 Sep 84 p 18

[Text] The Lisbon government's efforts to settle the "dispute" with Luanda have failed.

According to information from a reliable source, relations have been poisoned by Portuguese political forces known to all, who are making this region of the continent their last bastion of influence.

President Ramalho Eanes himself, at his own initiative or that of persons close to him, has given this problem its deserved importance, which has not been echoed on the part of Jose Eduardo dos Santos and some members of his government, who have now returned to Spain and France which "never made any contributions to Angola's independence."

Recent moves by Luanda, such as failing to invite Portugal to participate in its International Fair and its president's failure to include Lisbon on his European round, reveal the political ill will on the part of the former

colony's government towards the former colonial power.

Efforts have been made in various quarters to settle the situation. The recent trip to Angola by Cape Verde President Aristides Pereira focussed on Luanda-Lisbon relations, although it appears that nothing positive resulted from that mission.

Angolans are apprehensive about their government's position vis-a-vis Lisbon, especially since they realize that Portugal will continue to be the mainstay at the Portuguese-speaking African nations for many years to come.

This is obviously apparent to the presidents of Sao Tome and Principe, Mozambique, Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau, not only because of the excellent relations they maintain with Portugal, but also because of the respectful and friendly way in which their leaders are received here.

Only Angola maintains a haughty superiority in its relations with Portugal, which is not justified either by history or by the current situation or by the current situation or by mutual interests.

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## PERSPECTIVES ON DIFFICULT RELATIONS WITH ANGOLA

## Failed Eanes-dos Santos Meeting

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 20 Sep 84 p 16

[Article by Costa Carneiro]

[Text] Whereas Jose Eduardo dos Santos, president of Angola, began his first visit to countries of the Western World without Portugal being part of his itinerary, Jonas Savimbi, leader of the UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola], a movement opposed to the Luanda regime, was received in South Africa as a guest of honor at the inaugural ceremonies of the new president of South Africa. "We are condemned, for reasons of geography, to live with South Africa," Savimbi had said to journalists, whose presence in Capetown constituted a surprise to political observers.

For reasons that TEMPO cannot ascertain, the patiently and discreetly prepared plans for a meeting last weekend between Gen Ramalho Eanes and the Angolan president somewhere in southern Spain during the visit the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] made to the neighboring country fell through at the last minute.

Once more, Melo Antunes had bent to the wishes of Eanes. With Jose Eduardo dos Santos in Madrid, he had tried again to demonstrate that "the rupture of colonial relations never ends with slaps on the back and an exchange of compliments. There are complaints and hurts that take time to heal," but that must quickly be overcome in the interests of the two countries.

This in the wake of the contacts made recently in Luanda between the president's adviser and the Angolan leader.

With this trip to France, Italy and Spain, beyond the political and economic aspects that, for some reason or other, did not fully achieve the results that Jose Eduardo dos Santos had expected (although considered "very useful and fruitful"), the Angolan Government wanted, above all, to prove its political independence in relation to Moscow, especially at this time when some socialist leaders were not able to make the visits they had planned to countries of the West because --if we can believe the news agencies--the Kremlin was opposed to this.

It thus seems hasty to conclude that the noninclusion of Lisbon in this trip to Europe by President Jose Eduardo dos Santos is intended to signify that the Luanda government has other means to dispense with the favors of Lisbon.

According to a source very close to political circles in Luanda, the Angolan government continues to feel that, in political terms, Europe consists of all the countries contained therein but that in economic terms Europe, for Angola, is Portugal.

We read that a person close to President Jose Eduardo dos Santos said in Madrid that "Angola wants to establish relations with Spain that are complementary, but never competitive to or a substitute for those it maintains with Portugal, reaffirming its criterion of choosing the trading partners that best suit its interests, without this signifying," the diplomat emphasized, "a substitution or a competition of partners."

These affirmations cannot imply that with this attitude Angolan diplomacy intended to give our government a solemn warning, although acknowledging that relations between the former colony and its former metropolis are having difficulties that both, as a matter of fact, are responsible for.

But because unambiguous and fraternal relations of mutual respect are in the interest of both parties, what is necessary, from both sides of the Atlantic, is to shrewdly and sensibly act in such a way as to overcome all existing differences and without delay build loyal, sincere and cooperative relations. And, for this purpose, there has been no lack of initiatives on the Portuguese part which are not being supported simply because its political system prevents it, for instance, from silencing those who, in the antechambers, intrigue and poison these relations on behalf of interests that we think are less important compared to what is, in fact, in the national interest.

Moreover, Angola would like to think that it has partners in Portugal. Not only on the part of the government and politicians in general, but also on the part of exiled Angolans who, for the most part, constitute a unique force that is valuable and capable (because they are all trained managers) of confronting UNITA when tomorrow, as everything indicates, Jose Eduardo and Jonas Savimbi sit down at the negotiating table.

For this reason, the Luanda government feared that when the moment arrived it would not be able to play this trump--which is in fact the most important of all those that Luanda can play, presenting a solution that is honorable for both parties and does not diminish the MPLA.

In all of this there have been ambiguities, diversions, errors and omissions, but it is certain that all the former colonies received and are receiving from the Portuguese, since their independence, proof of respect for their sovereignty, and Angola, the only one which until now has not officially visited Portugal, cannot continue to be...the last.

The Luanda government, when indeed it is able to certify "who is the enemy," will put away the fears and the delusions that have been haunting it and will quickly

forces for relations with its former metropolis to develop in perfect harmony and nurture aspirations that the latter also desires.

#### Antunes Madrid Trip Questioned

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 22 Sep 84 p 1

[Text] On 18 September the Council of Ministers decided to lodge a strong protest with the president of the republic against the trip of State Counselor Melo Antunes to Madrid to meet with the president of Angola, then on an official visit to Spain, O EXPRESSO learned from a reliable source.

The government wants to learn from Ramalho Eanes under what pretext Melo Antunes was sent to Madrid, especially when his meeting with Jose Eduardo dos Santos comes at a particularly difficult point in the relations between the two countries.

The president of the Peoples Republic of Angola made an official visit to the neighboring country at the end of last week and as the windup to a European visit that also took him to Paris and Rome but purposely did not include Lisbon. During his European trip, Eduardo dos Santos referred to relations between the governments of Lisbon and Luanda, expressing the belief that Portuguese authorities have had an "unfair" attitude about his government, notably for permitting UNITA activity within the national territory.

Ramalho Eanes, in turn, has made efforts to get the Angolan president to accept an invitation to visit Portugal officially, without however having found any acceptance thus far.

The unexpected meeting of Melo Antunes with Jose Eduardo dos Santos in Madrid may have fit within that context, but the government considers it very poorly timed because it coincides with the criticism the Angolan leader has expressed publicly against the Portuguese authorities.

Mario Soares had sent Jose Eduardo dos Santos a personal message through Angola's representatives at the Arusha meeting between the Socialist International and front-line countries of Africa, suggesting an "open and frank" exchange of ideas about the real problems that hamper relations between Lisbon and Luanda.

At the Council of Ministers meeting last Tuesday, Jaime Gama was appointed to prepare a note of protest and a request for clarification to be sent to the president of the republic. However, when contacted by EXPRESSO, the spokesperson for the foreign affairs minister merely responded that "the meetings of the Council of Ministers are held in secret," refusing to divulge any information on the subject.

#### 'Angolan Unity Must Be Preserved'

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 22 Sep 84 p 16

[Article by Manuel de Lucena: "Luanda and Environs"]

[Excerpts] The title of my article today partially resumes that of the analysis by Jose Miguel Judice [JMJ] in last week's SEMANARIO, taking an acerbic view of

the current government of Angola. I must say that at heart I agree with his point of departure, consisting of a justified and indignant rejection of the fearful posture taken by our officials and our diplomats, except on rare occasions, for some years in their relations with everything in Angola that smacks of the MPLA. Moreover, I cannot but agree with the thesis he outlines that, in not reacting to what they do to it, Portugal attracts further affronts. This is because nations, as men, have nothing to gain in constantly turning the other cheek, and I also hope we soon get over this bad habit. And I salute his political courage for being the first to express this hope. But, beyond not agreeing with all his thoughts, I have objections to the strategy he proposes, apparently based upon the principle of a tit-for-tat response in keeping with the circumstances, which runs the risk of slipping into behavior that is excessively contractual or purely retaliatory. I think this would be harmful to us and would belittle us, unless we take into account some basic realities.

It happens that Angola is not yet (in fact, far from being) a fully developed nation, but rather a country essentially defined by the Portuguese colonialism, which was taking long strides when the Portuguese suddenly left. Hence, overnight political independence occurred without the great majority of the people having a common feeling of nationality. Outside of the political and cultural elites, it was ruled by essentially centrifugal tribalisms, which in fact straddled the existing borders and in part fed the civil war. This could not fail to be exasperating, perhaps even to the point of irreparable division, although paradoxically, on the other hand, the same war could also lead to overcoming it. Such action, to be in Portugal's higher and permanent interest, should favor unity of the inseparable Portuguese structure which is Angola. In a properly-understood "charity" it behooves us that its political independence--whose principle we acknowledged tardily but whose implementation we irresponsibly accelerated in 1975--serve to ultimately create one united nation speaking the Portuguese language. And not to divide this immense and very rich territory into (or among) several countries, easily subjugated by various world and regional powers.

It thus follows that a vigorous opposition to the unfriendly actions of this or any Angolan movement, party or government must never be confused with, much less be limited to, retaliation. Toughness can be resorted to, and in my opinion should have been, on more than one occasion. On that we agree. But the toughness must be restrained: in using it Portugal must give heed to its foreseeable effects on the standing question of Angola's unity, which to it is of greater interest. If we don't do this we will be running the risk of hurting ourselves, subjecting policy determination to the hostile disputants.

Properly understood, such a line of reasoning would never justify accepting the unacceptable: such as, for example, persecution of Portuguese citizens in the former colonies, serious attacks on our economic interests. Whenever higher values are attacked, our response must be sufficient to meet the aggression, but not in just any old way. On the other hand, in less-serious cases political skill and good sense will impose upon us certain unilateral concessions or even at times a simple shrug of the shoulders.

Understandably fed up with what we have been through, Jose Miguel Judice says and repeats that the current government of Angola now rules only Luanda and its

environs; this is another fact that must be faced. But he also suggests that its "not-glorious" end is approaching; and he expresses an indifference in principle as to who remains in power, precisely because he does not believe in the "myth" of a pro-Portuguese faction in the MPLA, "which we should have strengthened." I don't have enough room today to go into all this, but here are some things to think about during the coming week:

--Organized or not, there is certainly within the MPLA a decided pro-Portuguese force whose strengthening is in our best interests. The error lies in thinking that our constantly giving in strengthens it when, on the contrary, it weakens it. Only firmness is useful to us, and it should have begun in 1975, when instead of using it we disbanded.

--But it would be imprudent to exchange subservience for contempt, to give up on the MPLA and try to humiliate it. In 1975 it was already confined to "Luanda and environs..."

--Lastly, JMJ is correct in not wanting Portugal to become involved in Angola's civil war. But it is not a matter of indifference to us whether it is the MPLA or UNITA that is in power in Angola, if only because neither of them seems capable of assuring, by itself, a unity of Angola "oriented" toward Portugal. We don't have to choose between one or the other, but to contribute toward some other solution.

Patience, Understanding Counseled

Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 25 Sep 84 p 6

[Article by Paulo L. Marques: "Angola"]

[Excerpts] Our relations are not getting along famously, as everyone knows. During his recent trip to Europe Angola's President Jose Eduardo dos Santos was prodigal in his almost-hostile statements about Portugal. The complaints are of long standing and can be summed up in essentially two categories: that our press is hostile and openly critical of the MPLA and its government and that we give sanctuary to the UNITA. In regard to the first point there is nothing to be done. We are a country with freedom of expression, however much this may sadden the Marxist parties, and, moreover, many other countries also write articles and news items hostile to the Luanda government; we simply have the bad luck of their having learned to read Portuguese.

They thus become indignant about the DIABO and others because they are not reading the DAILY TELEGRAPH. In short, other than patiently and repeatedly explaining to them what a free press signifies, there is nothing to be done. Moreover, we have already done much (and perhaps critically), cooling off television and its impetuous newsmen as occurred recently with reportage about the UNITA. As for the groups that are active here, the government of Angola is right to some extent. Inasmuch as we do not have internal security forces, all this is left up to events, with difficulty of control and the inherent abuse of our hospitality and good nature.

But Paris, for example, has a public and functioning UNITA "bureau," whereas in Lisbon, so far as I know, there is not even a semiofficial office of this

organization. But this did not prevent Jose Eduardo dos Santos from going to Paris. Of course, because this is Lisbon, they feel "closer" to the problem. There are official PLO delegations in the majority, if not in all, the capitals of Europe, which does not prevent Israel from having friendly and at times close relations with many of such countries.

Moreover, these other countries push the problem over onto us. Thus, the BBC, when referring to a military bulletin issued by the UNITA, never fails to announce: "War communique issued in Lisbon..." Information given to the news agencies is also attributed to Lisbon, but that it was originally issued here is more doubtful. But it suits the other countries, who shelter UNITA and in practical terms give it more support, to heap the blame on us.

All this, the press, the statements "issued in Lisbon," are, of course, quickly transmitted to the Luanda government by the channels most interested in fomenting discord.

The PCP dreams of the times of the "privileged relationship" and does not admit that the interests of Portugal are being well developed and supported in Mozambique, for example. It is also curious to note that the Soviet ambassador Kalinine, who was in Portugal from 1974 to 1983, then went to Luanda. It is certainly a coincidence that relations between the two countries began to worsen just about 1 year ago.

Nor has our attitude toward the countries whose official language is Portuguese always been entirely sensible. We have too great a desire to announce in international circles and often publicly that we have a special "aptitude for Africa," that as a nation we have "a special relationship," that we are the only ones with the experience, the same language, a knack for getting along with "them," etc.

Although of course there is much truth in this, it isn't very bright to go around bragging about it so loudly. Our relations with these countries, which are sovereign and independent, must be developed with discretion, intelligence and coolness. But especially with discretion.

I believe that in the long run the real and permanent interests of the two countries lie in close cooperation, but this must be constructed calmly, patiently and professionally.

And is this constant use that the United States makes of us in southern Africa really in the long-term national interest? Are our policies that identical?

Lastly, the growing susceptibility of Luanda toward the activities of the UNITA is not disassociated from their hearing the shooting closer and closer to the center of the city that was called Sao Paulo de Luanda.

I feel that all this is quite fitting.

But what bothers me is the recent reaction, perhaps natural but in my opinion mistaken, that we Portuguese cannot continue to accept this situation. That we must react. This weekend I read an article by Jose Manuel Judice in which he strongly asserts

"that we cannot remain on our haunches" in face of the hostilities of the Angolan government. I hear it said that some persons advocate severing relations with Luanda.

In my opinion, this would be a grievous error. It is precisely this aggravation and divisiveness that these channels and forces want. The proper position of our government is one of patience, dignity, calmness and, above all, cool reasoning.

Due to reasons of an internal nature and the maneuvering of the great powers (from whom we perhaps should at times distance ourselves), we are suffering the hostility of certain ideological sectors of the MPLA. But experience shows that the history of post-colonial Africa tends to reaffirm the only permanent ideology in that continent, which is nationalism. Imported ideologies such as Marxism (or Maoism) have been short-lived. Let's not forget Mozambique.

Little by little, the traditional tyranny of fact and reality is reaffirmed.

Angola is going through a difficult period and the eventual solution for that fascinating and troubled country will depend very little upon us. So let us bear this difficult period calmly and serenely as the friends of the Angolan people that we have been throughout many centuries.

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CSO: 3542/5

## OPPOSITION WEEKLY VIEWS POSTPONEMENT OF EEC MEMBERSHIP

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 9 Oct 84 p 13

[Cartoon]



Key:

- (1) Finance Minister Ernani Lopes: "Why are you refusing to let us come in? Is it perhaps the pipe smoke that upsets you?"
- (2) 310 million deficit

CSO: 3442/19

## ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURE EQUIPMENT NEEDED FOR F-16 JETS

Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 4 Sep 84 p 4

[Article by Michel Mathot]

[Text] Electronic warfare has developed to the point that our F-16's, modern as they are, would be dangerously vulnerable in case of a conflict. From the moment of their procurement, it was decided that like the Mirages, they would be equipped with electronic countermeasures [ECM]. But the rise in the value of the dollar has been of such proportions in recent years that that program, like others, has had to be postponed.

The air force, which is already having a great deal of difficulty in providing its pilots with scarcely adequate training and a minimum of weaponry, no longer has enough funds for the purpose. On the basis of current planning, it would not be able to think about it until the start of the 1990's.

The reason is that there are other priorities in the 10-year National Defense Plan (howitzers, helicopters, heavy transport, radio communications, and so on) for which the overall budget is being tightly squeezed because of the economic crisis.

In view of the military importance of the ECM project and also its economic and technological advantages, however, other solutions for ensuring the procurement of ECM are conceivable. They are based on the parallel credits that the government may have available, and they will be discussed within the next few days.

## ECM

The "electronic threat" has become a basic component of modern warfare. The Yom Kippur War demonstrated its full importance on the battlefield as far back as about 10 years ago. And that importance was demonstrated with even more intensity during the conflicts in the Falklands and Lebanon.

The enemy threat to an air force is primarily that from surface-to-air missiles, which have very sophisticated detection and guidance systems. The problem, then, is to equip aircraft with suitable countermeasures enabling them to detect and identify anything threatening them and to respond immediately, notably by such means as jamming and dropping chaff.

The air force began studying that type of equipment at the start of the 1970's and defined the characteristics best suited to its needs. As a result of a call for tenders, the U.S. firm of Loral, which is associated with the MBL [Belgian Lamp and Electronics Plant], was selected to design a system for the Mirage 5B.

Christened RAPPORT II (Rapid Alert Programmed Power-Management of Radar Target), that system is housed entirely within the aircraft and manages both detection and the initiation of appropriate countermeasures through its main computer. Our fleet of Mirages has been equipped with that system.

When the decision to acquire F-16's was made, it was also decided to outfit them with ECM equipment, and the necessary expenditures were included in the air force budget. The solution recommended by the Americans at the time consisted of detection equipment inside the plane that would be connected to an external receptacle--a pod attached beneath the plane--containing the jamming systems.

That hybrid formula had many disadvantages, however (the loss of load capacity, more difficult handling, and so on). Belgian pilots preferred the "all-inside" solution, which had proven its worth through RAPPORT II, and they tried to interest their partners in the F-16 consortium in developing that system for the F-16.

Everyone waited, of course, to see what the Americans would do. And they came around to the idea of internal ECM as well, but decided to produce the ASPJ (Advanced Self-Protection Jamming), with which they are going to equip all of their air force and navy fighter planes. The project's scope, costs, and delays (the program is still under development today) struck the Belgian Air Force as prohibitive, and without waiting any longer, it decided to adapt the RAPPORT II to the F-16's. It was a less expensive solution, and at the time, its cost equaled that of the pod equipment.

In 1979, the CMCES [Ministerial Committee for Economic and Social Coordination] authorized the signing of a contract with General Dynamics and Loral for designing a RAPPORT system to be integrated in the F-16's. Two of the first production aircraft for Belgium were modified for the purpose by General Dynamics and loaned to Loral for about 6 months to allow development of the system in the United States.

When the tests were completed, the air force had SABCA [Belgian Aeronautical Construction Company] modify the aircraft that had already left the factory, while those coming off the assembly line now are ready to have RAPPORT III installed.

#### Dollar Effect

At that point, however, the breathtaking rise in the value of the dollar crashed headlong into the budgets. The air force, which had already spent over 1 billion FB [Belgian francs] to modify its aircraft (excluding the cost of prototypes) had to use the money set aside for that program to cover the effects of the rising dollar. It had no money left with which to continue developing the system, much less buy it. Israel, which was showing great interest in the

project, became involved in it, completed development, and bought the system. The result is that the improved RAPPORT III is going to equip Israeli F-16's, and this is frustrating to the Belgians, who started its development but cannot afford it any longer now that it has demonstrated its qualities.

When it was forced to postpone the program for lack of money, the air force had even reached the point of wondering how it was going to pay for the fuel for its aircraft, and its "boss" at the time had gone so far as to threaten to quit.

In those difficult circumstances, the air force nevertheless had to move up the date scheduled for ordering additional F-16's. It was a question of safeguarding the aircraft industry by avoiding a halt to the production of F-16's, and it was agreed in political circles to prefinance part of the purchase without touching the priorities in the 10-year plan. A somewhat similar solution might be found today to reactivate the RAPPORT III program, which has been dropped from the budget until the 1990's even though that system was to have been installed in the flight organizations beginning in 1982.

#### New Industrial Plan

Contrary to the situation that existed when the air force had to desist for lack of money, there now exists an industrial plan that would make it possible to revive the RAPPORT III program in Belgium. Development of the Teamco firm, a branch of the TEA group, has now made it possible for the company to exploit its license for the system. That license has been granted by Loral and Elisra (the Israeli firm that helped develop it). Under this plan, RAPPORT III could be produced in Belgium by Teamco as the prime contractor in partnership with Philips-MBLE, which was closely associated with the development of RAPPORT II.

The sizable technology transfers and the experience to be gained in this highly specialized field by Belgium would offer the advantage of allowing our country to join the highly restricted "club" of specialists in electronic warfare. Production would also generate high-tech jobs, all the more since Belgium would also be guaranteed a sizable share of the work in coproducing the systems sold to third countries.

It remains, of course, to finance the program, and that would cost some 4 billion FB. The Ministry of National Defense cannot even consider it for the moment, but Minister Vreven could, as one example, ask his colleagues to authorize access to the special budget tranches provided for cases of this kind. The Ministry of National Defense would then pay back the money when the credits became available as scheduled in the normal course of events.

That same formula was used in particular by Minister De Croo to help the RTT [Telegraph and Telephone Administration], and the principle behind it provided the mechanism making it possible to order additional F-16's. It requires a much broader political consensus, however, than a normal budget allocation does, and that does not simplify matters.

While everyone agrees on the necessity--and urgency--of equipping the F-16's with electronic countermeasures, the same unanimity does not exist when it comes

to the actual decision. The fact that Teamco is located next to the national airport--and therefore in Flanders--obviously weighs heavily in the intercommunity balance, all the more since this newcomer to the aeronautical market has already pulled off some pretty good "deals."

Since, moreover, Teamco has chosen Liege as the site of its new plant (the land has already been bought) for the production of microwave systems to take care of the some 8 billion FB worth of related orders from Loral and others at the conclusion of the contract (12 billion FB in total until the 1990's), the "war of the basins" is also threatening to heat up as a result of the deal. The Charleroi plateau's efforts to achieve an "aeronautical monopoly" are felt to be doubly threatened now by this "Flemish program with its fallout for Liege."

Military, economic, and industrial interest are one thing, but it is necessary to deal with the community, regional, and political problems, none of which is of a nature to facilitate solutions.

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## CHIEF OF ARMED FORCES STAFF DEFENDS T-72 TANK

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 21 Sep 84 p 13

[Article: "German General Criticizes Finland's New Tanks"]

[Text] The modern T-72 type tanks to be purchased for the Finnish Defense Forces have been subjected to rather severe criticism in two international weapons technology publications.

West German General Karl Schnell discusses the recent Lebanon war in journals WEHRTECHNIK and MILITARY TECHNOLOGY. Schnell was deputy commander of the West German Defense Forces in 1973 when he visited the Sinai and the Golan Heights after the Yom Kippur war. He was in Israel again in the spring of 1983.

It is pointed out in MILITARY TECHNOLOGY that the general's information is based on Israeli sources exclusively. He has not had any contacts with Syrian or Soviet armed forces.

Schnell's extensive article has also been quoted in the most recent SOTILASAI-KAKAUSLEHTI published by the League of Officers.

The section that is of interest to the Finns concerns the T-72 tank. During the Lebanon war Syrian troops had Soviet T-series tanks, which were primarily the obsolete T-55 and T-62 models.

In his article Schnell concentrates on a comparison between the Merkava tanks, primarily built and developed in Israel, and the T-72 tank, which is classified as an exceptionally modern tool of combat.

The Merkava and T-72 tanks were involved in combat for the first time during the Lebanon war. The German general places them side by side first on the basis of preliminary assessments.

#### Merkava Has Poor Advance Reputation

The T-72 had a rather good advance reputation among the experts while the Merkava's terrain and firing properties, for example, were evaluated as poor. However, the Merkava laid any prejudices to rest and turned out to be better

in combat than the American-made M-60 tanks and the British-made Centurion tanks.

General Schnell sticks to the facts based on figures in his article even though he thinks the poor combat performance of the T-72 tanks is the result of insufficient crew training. The crews' ability to handle the weapon was "sad" according to Schnell.

#### Not One Hit

For example, the Syrians did not hit one target with the T-72, which is quite strange with respect to the number of T-72 tanks in Schnell's opinion.

The Syrians were using Soviet-made 115 and 126 millimeter smooth cylinder tank cannons.

The Israeli 105-millimeter projectile turned out to be more effective than the corresponding Syrian 125-millimeter projectile. General Schnell believes that the Soviet projectile can be further developed.

In addition to a poor combat performance, the author has collected a long list of deficiencies.

The T-72 will catch fire easily and is more susceptible to fire than the even otherwise susceptible T-62. The experts believe that one of the reasons for this is the projectile space of the automated firing system in the turret, which is not included in the 62 model. The Israeli dovetail-guided projectile penetrated the front portion of the T-72's newest multilayered armor and frequently set the tank on fire at the same time.

It has been subsequently confirmed that the heavier hollow projectiles also penetrate the T-72 tank.

The Syrian tank commanders were very dissatisfied with the 700-horsepower engines, which became overheated in the rocky terrain. The T-72 weighs 42 tons and the Merkava weighs 60 tons.

The Israelis destroyed 30 T-72 tanks prior to the armistice. All in all, the Syrians lost 500 tanks, of which the Israelis received 200 as war booty.

Israeli losses were few -- a ratio of 10 to one. General Schnell believes the reasons to be the better training of the Israelis, more effective combat leadership, and complete air superiority in the area.

#### Tank Brigade To Receive T-72 Tanks

Before the end of the current year Finland will receive its first T-72 tanks, which will be assigned to the Parola Tank Brigade. They will replace the T-54 tanks, which have become obsolete after more than 20 years of service. A team of Finnish instructors and technical personnel is already receiving training in the operation of the tanks in the USSR.

The procurement is connected with the tank equipment renewal program, which was considered imperative by the Third Parliamentary Defense Committee, among others.

The value of the procurement and the number of tanks has not yet been made public.

Lieutenant General Pentti Vayrynen, the military supply chief of the Chief of Staff responsible for procurements for the defense forces, admits that the T-72 was criticized in certain foreign military journals before the decision to procure them was made.

"We are not concerned about the information presented. The tank has been researched and has been confirmed to be suitable for us," states Lieutenant General Vayrynen.

He also points out that effective use of the weapon is, to a great degree, dependent on training.

"The target accuracy of a certain weapon may be 90 percent in the hands of certain troops and only 11 percent in the hands of other troops. This was confirmed, for example, in the Middle East," he emphasizes.

Vayrynen does not take a stand on General Schnell's thinking that the tank's weaponry can be further developed. In his opinion this is not timely at least at this stage.

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**MILITARY APPLICATIONS IN NUCLEAR ENERGY COMMISSION'S REPORT**

Paris COMMISSARIAT A L'ENERGIE ATOMIQUE in French 1984 pp 73-79

[Text] The Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) is responsible for producing and maintaining in operational condition the nuclear charges and warheads of French weapons, while directing its research efforts toward the creation of arms of ever-increasing performance and capable of maintaining their efficiency in spite of the foreseeable progress in defensive methods.

The CEA is also responsible for research and development of nuclear boilers intended for naval propulsion through its affiliate Technicatome to which these tasks are assigned.

The salient developments of 1983 were the delivery to the armed forces of the first nuclear warhead of the M4 weapons system, the beginning of production related to the first ASMP [air-to-ground medium range missile], and the official sea trials of the second French nuclear attack submarine.

**Nuclear Experiments**

It was possible to carry out all the nuclear tests planned for 1983 in spite of successive cyclones which struck French Polynesia during the first half of the year, with Mururoa hardly being affected, especially because of protective measures taken against storm-related water hazards in 1982, to which further improvements are proposed.

These test firings were very productive in terms of information for the development and production of nuclear weapons for the next 10 years, as well as for the research necessary for the selection and design of weapons to be developed over the longer term (1994-2000).

The methods of carrying out test firing in the central zone of the atoll have now been well mastered; it was possible to increase the frequency and the intensity of these tests progressively up to the standards required by the test programs.

**Nuclear Weapons Programs**

In 1983, the nuclear charges and warheads which equip the weapons in service were maintained in a high state of readiness.

The delivery on 12 July to the armed forces at Ile Longue of the first of the multiple warheads which will equip the M4 missiles for use on the missile launching nuclear submarine "Inflexible," is the result of more than 10 years of effort by the Directorate of Military Applications (DAM). This achievement, carried out in strict conformity to the overall program, marks a decisive stage in the modernization of our deterrent force. In fact, the large number of nuclear warheads, their superior nuclear yield, their high level of hardening, their greatly reduced "surface equivalent radar" and the procedures for their spacing will provide the strategic weapons with increased effectiveness and penetration capabilities. The level of miniaturization and weight reduction attained permit a range quite superior to that which was originally planned, increasing the size of possible launching zones and thereby reducing the vulnerability of the submarines carrying them.

It should also be noted that the production of multiple warhead missiles is especially significant for a country like France which, for its strategic armament, is forced to rely on a relatively limited number of launchers.

Work on development of an improved version of the M4 warhead has been continued, as well as the production of the first batch of charges for the ASMP airborne missiles to equip the air force.

Regarding future systems, the decision was made to initiate the development of the Hades tactical weapons system.

#### Scientific and Technical Research Programs

The production of weapons with continually improved performance requires a sustained effort in scientific and technical research.

In 1983, the DAM continued its work in the many disciplines associated with the physics and the technology of weapons, areas where experimentation is rare and costly and where the phenomena are at once very complex, extremely short lived and characterized by unusual states of matter. For these studies, it is necessary to use, besides nuclear experiments, theoretical models and digital simulation methods based on high performance tools like the Cray 1 supercomputer and the Octal 82 laser, used for studies of dense plasmas. Even though they have only recently been put into service, these devices have already enabled the achievement of very promising results. The calculating potential of the DAM has just been reinforced by the acquisition of two new computers including a second Cray 1.

Additionally, the construction of the high-powered laser Phebus is in progress.

To cite some examples of work leading to production:

--in nuclear physics, an experimental device christened "Casimir" (a chamber associated with a system for identifying and measuring reacting ions) was designed to be used with the Gamil accelerator at Caen and the Sara accelerator at Grenoble in order to study the reaction mechanics resulting from

collisions of heavy ions; it includes large scale detectors (ionization chamber, plate counter, microchannel wafer detector, hodoscope. . .) adapted to a reaction chamber, and produced, in certain cases, in collaboration with teams from the IRF [Basic Research Institute] at Saclay. The first experiments, conducted in 1983, with this device in conjunction with accelerators led to interesting interpretations;

--a hot isostatic compression device, unique in France for its performance, has been put into operation; it can achieve a temperature of 2000° C and a pressure of 300 (MPa) thus permitting the production and handling of certain materials which would not be possible using traditional methods and producing significant saving of raw materials;

--in the realm of studies of hardening of certain sites and devices against the effects of electromagnetic pulse created by an aerial nuclear explosion, the DAM has designed and developed generators capable of producing high tension fast rise surges; these devices allow the simulation of the effects on power lines supplying installations which must be protected and the production of specific protective devices (clipping and filtration components and cells);

--a hierarchical system of automatic surveillance and control for the "Saphir" research installations has been developed with the goal of assuring rapid surveillance and remote control of evolutive industrial installations of medium size (500 sensors or actuators); it includes two microcomputers (8086/8087) capable of multi-task operation and to assure, in particular, the implementation of a control graph, the linked implementation of pre-programmed automatic sequences, as well as the management of "operator command-control" peripherals.

Also, the DAM is conducting industrial upgrading work.

Tests carried out at the Center for Scientific and Technical Research at Aquitaine, related to the evaluation of the effect of aerial overpressure waves produced by the detonation and deflagration of gaseous shells of significant size on structures or elements of structures, have made possible the debugging computer codes to validate the response of a nuclear power station to this kind of attack.

The Detection and Geophysics Laboratory of the DAM has set up seismological measurement security procedures, which are designed to trigger the shutdown of the reactor of the Superphenix power station immediately upon detection of seismic waves jeopardizing its operation; these procedures should be placed in service during the year 1984.

Special containers have been designed and produced for ground and air transport of hazardous substances (nuclear, explosive or toxic). Their characteristics should permit them to withstand aerial accidents and fire.

The DAM also is continuing to promote the development of composite materials for its own needs and took part in the creation of the new Composite Materials Institute in Aquitaine.

In the realm of energy conservation, the research center at Bruyeres-le-Chatel has set up a low temperature geothermal installation tying into the existing heating network. It functions with water collected at 34° C at a depth of between 650 and 735 meters in a Neocomian aquifer, which was hardly known before this operation. The determination of the characteristics of this reservoir is of obvious interest to the region.

#### Naval Propulsion Reactors

In 1983, the missile launching nuclear submarines (SSBN) carried out their missions without any problems. It was possible to keep three of them at sea simultaneously. The reduction of maintenance periods between patrols has had no effect on the reliability of the reactors. Also, the first (non-nuclear) tests of the generator of the *Inflexible* took place at the end of the year.

The first quarter was devoted to the completion of the boiler of the nuclear attack submarine (SSN) "Saphir," which was subjected to official sea trials 1 July; these trials went very satisfactorily and the commissioning of the second French SSN into active service is now being prepared for.

The design studies for boilers for the new generation SSBN and aircraft carriers have been carried out in conjunction with the Technical Service for Naval Manufacturing and Arms.

The land based prototype (PAT) of the SSBN reactor fulfilled, with no shortcomings, its essential function, which is to serve as support for training courses for teams on this kind of vessel.

Finally, the integrated shop for the production of naval fuels was put into service on the Technicatome site at Cadarache.

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CSO: 3519/509

## MANAGEMENT, LABOR UNION OFFICIALS DISCUSS 35-HOUR WEEK

Paris L'EXPANSION in French 5 Jul 84 pp 60-63

[Interviews with Yvon Chotard, CNPF social affairs official, and Edmond Maire, CFDT general secretary, by Emile Favard; date and place of interviews not specified]

[Text] [Question] And so the 35-hour week is "irrevocably unacceptable" to the CNPF [National Council of French Employers]?

[Yvon Chotard] I feel like giving you a whimsical answer. It's acceptable ... but in 2004. Today, reducing the work week to 35 hours would be suicidal for our economy. In the middle of an economic war, this would be tantamount to unilateral disarmament in the face of foreign competition.

Our country is still going through the crisis, whereas the United States and Japan seem to have overcome it and the FRG seems to be on the verge of doing so. Everything looks as though the French airplane is still in the midst of turbulence, while some kilometers ahead, the Japanese plane and the American plane are flying in fair weather. In 20 years, a 35-hour week will be possible, I hope, but between now and then our place in the world, our standard of living and employment depend on the intensity and quality of our labor.

[Question] Twenty years is the length of a generation.... Don't you think that the division of labor could meet the unemployment problem and that the 35-hour week is a long-awaited social achievement?

[Yvon Chotard] Let's be very clear about these issues: the CNPF is in favor of the reduction of working hours, viewed as social progress. Over the long term, this reduction is a natural and irreversible phenomenon for postindustrial societies. Thus it is also true that, without legislation, annual working hours in France declined by nearly 200 between 1970 and 1980. The reduction of working hours is not a matter of principle. It is a function of the potential of businesses and the economy.

On the other hand, the CNPF believes that the reduction of working hours is not an instrument for combating unemployment. Didn't James Ball and Michel Albert state in their report to the European Parliament that the actual working hours

of workers in France is 1,650 hours as opposed to 1,690 hours in the FRG, 1,750 hours in Great Britain, 1,870 hours in the United States and 2,100 hours in Japan? In Europe, Switzerland has both the longest working hours--1,910 hours--and the lowest unemployment; Belgium has the shortest working hours--1,510 hours--and the highest unemployment. So don't talk to me about the division of labor as a means of overcoming unemployment! We have assessed the results of the 39-hour work week and they are negative.

And then, for France in 1984, recommending reduction of the work week to 35 hours is a Malthusian approach of withdrawing into oneself. It is a position of resignation and renunciation. It is true that in times of confusion, the old demons reappear. Some people then prefer to take the easy way out and follow a path of renunciation rather than one of effort and perseverance.

[Question] But industrial modernization is at least an opportunity for modifying working hours and, among other things, reducing them?

[Yvon Chotard] You're adding fuel to my argument. You must also acknowledge that it was the CNPF that first began a detailed consideration of this matter, and such consideration must be constantly updated and supplemented in three ways.

First, with regard to working hours, it would be preferable to argue on the basis of annual working hours, or even better on the basis of a lifetime of work. In this regard, our government has been wisely motivated to send a mission beyond the Rhine to examine how this problem is being handled there.

Secondly, there is the "bill" to be paid. Unless business is to be penalized, a reduction of working hours should at least be accompanied by a proportional reduction of wages. But some people retort: "Why aren't you satisfied with a partial wage adjustment, since experience proves that by reducing working hours, you increase your productivity?" This overlooks the fact that increases in productivity should not be entirely attributed to the reduction of working hours alone.

Businesses have a duty to the country to invest, to prepare for the future. Thus any measure involving a cost for business, and even any measure with zero cost, must be ruled out, for our competitors use their productivity increases to lower their prices and to invest.

[Question] Thus in your opinion, everything must be borne by wage earners alone. Your trade-off is one of leisure time in exchange for purchasing power?

[Yvon Chotard] Or in exchange for training, as Paul Marchelli suggests. Our position is not a position of doctrine. It is based on analysis of the constraints of international competition and the capabilities of businesses. In this regard, industrialized countries must move forward on an equal footing or at least harmoniously.

[Question] However, without this taking place by relying heavily on laws applicable to everyone?

[Yvon Chotard] Like what took place in the 1970's, working hours should be reduced on the basis of business capabilities: the extent of productivity increases, utilization of production potential, market position, the nature of the business.... Rigid, constricting systems must therefore be avoided. The negotiators who will meet on 25 June to discuss the adaptation of working conditions will have to imagine a general framework allowing the greatest possible freedom for experiments and diversified solutions.

By accepting a negotiation of such scope, social partners provide proof of their maturity. Now we have gone beyond the rejection of modern improvements, beyond being unwilling to destroy looms. The business has become the place where technical advances can be mastered in the interest of everyone and no longer the place where technical advances are imposed on everyone. This negotiating process is undoubtedly the most ambitious one in the last 15 years.

Because in the CNPF we have always counted on the realism of our trade union partners, I haven't given up hope of reaching, after several months of negotiations, reasonable and acceptable compromises for everyone.

[Question] And your third point of consideration?

[Yvon Chotard] Progress also means the diversification of labor laws. Thus in the negotiations, the CNPF hopes to bring up the question of special kinds of work, such as part-time work, temporary work, contracts of specific duration and all forms of "differentiated labor." One social innovation in coming years will probably be the abandonment of the unique notion of "full-time work." Why maintain a standard imposing a 39-hour work week, 5 weeks of vacation and retirement at age 60 on wage earners?

We will not be able to meet the challenges of new technologies with the simplistic ideas of mass schedules. Fortunately, things are beginning to change in trade union organizations: the principle of individualized schedules is being challenged less and less.

[Question] Besides schedule flexibility, you are also asking for flexibility in the case of regulations, for laying off employees, for example. And if legislators comply with your request, do you think that it would even be possible to create some 470,000 jobs in 1 year?

[Yvon Chotard] This figure is based on a survey of business leaders. At least 470,000 jobs could be created if certain restrictions on hiring conditions were relaxed. These are potential jobs, that is, jobs held captive by excessive regulation. Do you know what the head of a business told me the other day in Rodez? "We live in a country in which it is easier to separate from a woman with whom you have lived for 25 years than from an employee hired a few months ago."

However, if we are requesting more flexibility for heads of businesses, it is not only for laying off employees, but also for hiring them. Thus if we expect French businesses to be able to honor special orders--in the case of export agreements in particular--they must have more flexibility. Mrs Cresson has definitely understood this, since she is fighting to extend the length of contracts of specific duration from 6 to 18 months. And so far as I know, she is certainly a member of the government.

[Question] Should the international coordination you mentioned a while ago be based on American practices?

[Yvon Chotard] I am a supporter of liberal solutions and I admit to being one of the most "pro-Reagan" French business leaders. However, I don't advocate American-style solutions. Our social history must be taken into account. The CNPF wants to achieve negotiated solutions; let the government therefore eliminate official authorization for laying off employees and allow social partners to decide how to develop the necessary guarantees for wage earners!

[Question] But in most cases--exactly 51.1 percent in 1983--there were "small" layoffs (less than 10 at a time) for which you had a "green light" in less than 2 weeks?

[Yvon Chotard] Of course, but Labor Ministry inspectors are too inclined to meddle in the management of businesses. Who can judge better than the head of a business whether or not an economic layoff is necessary? It is the job of Labor Ministry inspectors to see that social laws are properly enforced and it is the job of business leaders to manage their businesses!

[Question] Do you yourself have a personalized work schedule?

[Yvon Chotard] I work more than 18 hours daily and my three meals are devoted to my professional activities. I play tennis on Saturday afternoons. Sunday is devoted to my family, except the afternoons, when I read manuscripts for my publishing company, France-Empire. I have set myself a goal of reading 300 of them a year, in order to publish about 100. I am afraid that my actual annual working hours are not markedly higher than those of a Japanese wage earner....

[Question] Is it really reasonable to demand a 35-hour work week when France already has a reputation for working less than its competitors...?

[Edmond Maire] Trade unionists such as ourselves, who strive to respect the facts and to lay their cards on the table, cannot tolerate the distortion of figures. According to our calculations, French workers work 1,778 hours annually and not 1,650 hours, as Mr Gattaz claims. Do you know--I am quoting ILO statistics--that the (average, of course) American has already cleared the 35-hour work week hurdle? In 1972, he worked exactly 34.8 hours [a week]. The CNPF is wrong to abandon any strict approach in order to adhere to a combative ideological line of reasoning, as Mr Gattaz has done by calling trade unions "destructive." Quite fortunately, Mr Chotard opened the negotiations in progress on a different note....

[Question] The fact remains that another reduction of working hours represents a cost to business and to the wage earner, or a risk for both....

[Edmond Maire] An opportunity, if anything! It is too easy to caricature our approach to the 35-hour week in order to better criticize it.

This approach, in fact, has its own economic justification. If France acknowledges a competitive lag behind a good number of industrialized countries, it isn't because of its wage costs. Serious studies prove that they are not as high as those of the United States, Germany and Sweden. The number one evil is an obsolete, highly stratified organization of labor that is subject exclusively to the decisions of heads of businesses. If we were to believe the CNPF chairman, only the boss has the "right" solution. Reformers, even employers, have the greatest difficulty in making any breakthroughs. In this antiquated cultural context, the goal of the 35-hour week in our eyes constitutes an unparalleled opportunity for modifying the organization of labor, which is a welcome constraint, since it is apt to bring about positive changes. It is actually an opportunity for making the most of the entire potential of the business, the talents of managerial personnel and the abilities of wage earners who are better trained than they used to be. In terms of efficiency, the business can only gain: in productivity and thus in competitiveness.

This microeconomic approach, through a business-oriented plan, will certainly have macroeconomic repercussions that are much more positive than those offered to us by mere statistical models.

[Question] Such a reorganization will also reveal the overstaffing of French businesses....

[Edmond Maire] But without increasing the number of unemployed workers, on the contrary. The primary goal of reducing working hours is employment. We should avoid arguing only about large-scale industry, in which it would not be difficult at all, by reducing working hours, to manage to maintain staffs. We should not overlook the possibilities for growth--and thus for creating jobs--of PME [small and medium-size businesses] and the tertiary sector, in services and communications in particular.

I am always amazed that distinguished economists consciously deal with the cost of the 35-hour week not only by considering the organization of labor as intangible, but also by completely ignoring the present cost of unemployment to the nation. We should remind them of the bill: 260 billion francs in 1983--nearly 7 percent of the GDP [Gross Domestic Product]--in benefits paid out and in uncollected tax and social security revenues, or 10,750 francs per unemployed worker per month.

[Question] By thus emphasizing the reorganization of the business, you are advocating the establishment of the 35-hour week--or any other form of reduced working hours--without legal intervention, but rather case by case.

[Edmond Maire] Work schedules are too disparate and the solutions too diversified from one sector to another for us to be able to recommend a law on the 35-hour week. On the other hand, if employers continue to hesitate in the face of the continual increase in unemployment, the government will definitely have to provide a twofold incentive. One that is psychological, first of all, and then regulatory, by reducing maximum working hours and generalizing the restoration of overtime. These measures could provide salutary pressure to encourage negotiations on working hours between company managements and trade unions.

[Question] Do you already have a compulsory annual meeting?

[Edmond Maire] Yes, and negotiating the development of wages and working hours every year is a good thing.

The trade union will thus get beyond the myth of constant action to concentrate its efforts on preparing for and carrying out this annual negotiating process; it is an excellent opportunity for seriously examining the condition of the business and its capabilities.

[Question] This means that you accept the debate, launched by employers, on relaxing regulations.

[Edmond Maire] We reject the challenging of collective guarantees achieved through hard work, but we are not against flexible regulations. Proof: we have already accepted an annual quota of 130 possible hours of overtime without authorization of the Labor Ministry's Department of Inspection, jobs divided into two shifts and even, in the case of very large investments, weekend work. We are the ones who asked the CNPF for further discussion of part-time jobs. The CNPF is concealing uniform behavior in the field behind its verbal demand for flexibility. For business leaders have as yet done little exploration of the reservoir of flexibility provided by new labor laws. In fact, employers often reject a different organization that would enable employees wishing to do so to work part time. We don't mind the reduction of working hours over a year or over a lifetime, provided the employee is protected against possible abuses. This is also a good method of reducing the working hours of managerial personnel, whose constraints hamper a shortening of the work day.

In short, the arsenal of laws offers great possibilities, but most employers--fortunately, there are also dynamic businessmen--are afraid to utilize these possibilities, because of hierarchical tradition, I would say. I also wonder whether that tradition isn't strengthened by ulterior political motives. Isn't history in the process of repeating itself, but in an upside-down fashion? Prior to 1981, there were many on the left who did not talk about the reorganizations needed to be competitive internationally, in order not to weaken the campaign against the government in place. Today, isn't the thinking of many business leaders similar?

[Question] Then what method do you recommend for achieving the 35-hour week?

[Edmond Maire] Multistage negotiations. The CFDT is awaiting the outcome of the present negotiations to make recommendations to the CNPF for technical fields; and on the outcome of the latter, to provide guidelines for businesses; and on that, to reach innovative agreements combining modernization of technologies and organization of labor, reduction and distribution of working hours, creating of jobs. We already know of many businesses in which working hours have been reduced and which have subsequently obtained market shares.

[Question] But wage earners--and polls confirm this--prefer their purchasing power to any increase in leisure time.

[Edmond Maire] There are two opposite cases. Wage earners faced with threatened layoffs always prefer their jobs. The others are as yet insufficiently aware that no job is ever fully guaranteed when the dikes of unemployment have been broken. It is our role as trade unionists to get wage earners to debate the risks of the present situation and the solutions to be provided. Wage problems resulting from a reduction of working hours are not an insurmountable obstacle. There are so-called "smoothing-out" technical formulas--that is, for a temporarily less rapid increase in wages than in prices--which make it possible to avoid any reduction of direct earnings in the event of a reduction of working hours.

[Question] What lessons have you learned from the German battle for the 35-hour week?

[Edmond Maire] Above all, that German trade unionism is able to prepare at length, at least in the case of the metallurgical industry, the conditions for a powerful and massive action despite all sorts of obstacles. This is an encouragement for French wage earners to unionize and to push our country's trade unions in the direction of a pragmatic and effective unity of action and demands aimed at economic and social changes capable of guaranteeing everyone's future.

[Question] How long do you work?

[Edmond Maire] As much as any trade unionist who adds up his regular job and his union activities every day. Much less than when I was a young union official: in 20 years, I have obtained my weekends, at least to a large extent.

11915  
CSO: 3519/494

## INACCURATE REPORTING CONTRIBUTES TO INDUSTRIAL CRISES

Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French 10 Sep 84 p 64

[Article by Patrice Galambert: "Clarity"]

[Text] Steel industry, shipyards, Creusot-Loire, automobile industry. Each time, we find the same sad script. We see powerful groups, apparently stable. Yet, when there is a crisis, the first cracks appear. At first, nobody has the courage to unmask them in broad daylight, to impose the necessary measures. The cracks widen, but the silence remains. They continue to increase salaries, to talk of shortening the work week, to believe in miracles, to hope that the state will pay... Collective blindness which, in the short run, suits everybody. Eventually we must, however, always deal with reality and soon brutal decisions, factory closings, mass dismissals, even bankruptcy petitions become inevitable. To avoid such a series of events, a minimal consensus among management, unions and personnel on the true financial situation of their company appears more and more indispensable. If indeed the personnel are soon conscious that their company is in danger, they will accept more readily reasonable sacrifices (wage freezes, technical unemployment, hiring freezes) which, if they are agreed upon in time, will perhaps allow the situation to be straightened out and to avoid a tragedy. But, concretely, how can we achieve a successful dialogue, how can we manage to speak the truth and without delay on the figures?

If the figures reflect reality, they still must be understandable and the financial reality must be as close as possible to the economic reality. Too often, the presentation of the results is incomprehensible to the layman, as if the management technicians imagined they were the only ones to utilize their production. Has anyone ever seen a film destined solely for directors, a newspaper written only for newspapermen? On the contrary, a simple and clear presentation is often the trademark of logical reasoning which has been able, beyond the technical subtleties, to identify the basic variables, the striking results. To facilitate this dialogue with the personnel, its representatives (economic committee of the CE [expansion unknown], union representatives...) should receive the necessary training, the methods of presentation should be modified as seldom as possible, it would perhaps be advantageous to stop at the gross excess operating costs, the most significant result and the closest to the operating activity of the company. But for this result to be easy to interpret, the turnover must still result from sales on the market and not from the transfer prices, the direct costs must represent the main part of the cost price, the currency variations must not affect the results too much.

Reliable figures, understandable ones, the main ingredient is still lacking, namely a climate of trust. To instill it, it is of the utmost importance not to wait until the clouds gather, for such a belated dialogue will then risk being seen as a manipulation. Conversely, the unions will have to act in a responsible manner and not suspect, a priori, all information coming from management. Furthermore, the dialogue will have to be complete, to not limit itself to the results of the past period but to touch on the future: plan and budget. As far as possible, the internal information which is thus disseminated must, to be believable, be consistent with the external information, even if, in certain cases, one should hesitate to alarm dealers or bankers. Then, if there are gaps, they will have to be justified. Finally, economic information will only have real meaning if it is made concrete by a share in the results. And the wage earners will accept all the more readily to suffer the consequences of a rigorous policy if they have earlier benefited from the fruits of expansion.

In conclusion, it is precisely when a company is prosperous that a dialogue on the figures must be started up, dialogue which will take years before it succeeds. But from this success will grow a solidarity which, for the company, will constitute a much more secure guarantee than any bank guarantee.

8956  
CSO: 3519/513

**MINISTER OF LABOR ON UNEMPLOYMENT, PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French 17 Sep 84 pp 62-63

[Interview with Michel Delebarre, minister of labor, employment and occupational training, date and place not specified]

[Text] The new head of the enlarged ministry of labor, which includes employment and occupational training, Michel Delebarre, reserved his first interview for LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE. He verbally reviewed the troops on the five fronts of unemployment that were defined during "The Hour of Truth" by the prime minister.

LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE: At the end of 3 years of battling unemployment do you still have new ideas? Can we avoid having 2.5 or 3 million unemployed? Have you set measurable goals?

Michel Delebarre: I don't intend to set a number and no one asked me to do so. As the prime minister stressed, you cannot decree the creation of jobs. For the past 3 years many measures have been taken to help those looking for jobs to get training and to enter the world of work. My goal is for these measures to produce their maximum yield. The battle for employment and training--I avoid separating the two--takes place where all those in charge are involved. As for the governments, as I had the opportunity to stress to the commissioners of the republic meeting at the initiative of the minister of state for interior and decentralization, I hope that within the framework of national measures for assisting employment and training greater flexibility will be possible in order to respond better and more quickly to locally recognized needs.

LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE: We have heard that "social management" of unemployment is finished. But is there an alternative?

Michel Delebarre: The prime minister answered your question very clearly. The fight against unemployment and for employment is waged on five fronts, which are growth, creation and development of businesses, organization of work in the broad sense, encouraging jobs in the public interest and training. This orientation which has been given to the government's effort (an effort all should take part in) should allow us to combat the three phenomena that currently characterize unemployment in France.

The first is the duration of unemployment which today is an average of 1 year. The second is the presence, among those looking for work, of groups that are particularly affected: the young, those over 50 or 55 and single women who are heads of households. Lastly, it is very detrimental for those looking for work to be placed in the "inactive" category, which in the public opinion is liable to equate with laziness. They begin a process of marginalization which makes it even more difficult for them to find work. To break this vicious cycle they must either be given training or offered a job or employment--whether you call it a job in the public interest or a socially useful job doesn't matter. We must respond to real needs which today's commercial market does not meet.

LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE: To what extent is a precarious job better than no job at all?

Michel Delebarre: The worst thing is inactivity, which is not to be confused with laziness. Work contracts of fixed duration have probably become as popular as they have because they take into account the uncertainties of the time. They are a way to access the world of work. Perhaps this should be made easier so that these contracts are more accessible to small businesses. New laws are not needed; it is a question of application and ANPE [National Employment Agency] is well suited for that.

The same is true for temporary work, now that the ordinance passed 2 years ago has improved a debatable situation. The evaluation that will be made in spring 1985 already appears to be quite positive. I hope to review all these questions with labor and management between now and the end of the month.

LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE: How often can a young person refuse in-service training or a less-than-ideal job without losing his rights to unemployment payments? In other words, can we be quick and efficient without a minimum of constraints?

Michel Delebarre: You are aware of the very ambitious goal set by the prime minister: that between now and the end of 1985 all young persons under 21 will be offered either training or a job--a job in a business or employment in the public interest. Is this effort, which directly favors young people and those looking for jobs, compatible with a total lack of constraints or reciprocal commitments? I don't think so. We must help those looking for jobs, but I am against a system of assistance except in cases of extreme need. We will do everything possible to offer those seeking jobs several possibilities: training, placement, employment in the public interest. In return, they must have certain obligations. Of course, all of this requires time and cooperation, which is the reason for all the meetings that I am currently conducting.

LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE: What will you keep from the various proposals initiated by the CNPF [National Council of French Employers]?

Michel Delebarre: We recently examined with labor and management the conditions for implementing the agreement on alternating training that will affect 300,000 young people. As for Gattaz's proposals on specific numbers and on layoffs, employers and unions began to talk about that again last Monday. I have no position to take at the present time. As part of contractual policy, the prime minister wanted these negotiations to go far and fast while emphasizing that we will not build employment on the ruins of social legislation.

LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE: Last year you were counting on 850,000 in-service training jobs and there were 500,000. How do you explain this difference and the fact that these training jobs lead to few permanent jobs--39,000 according to the report prepared by your ministry?

Michel Delebarre: Jobs are not made solely through training, just as all training is not solely geared to employment. Continuing education and an attempt to change one's qualifications can have more personal goals. In addition, setting up in-service training programs that have real value requires a lot of time and effort. But we must go further. Not all the resources of national education are used: couldn't some CEP's [Professional Education Centers] or technical schools organize job training and placement seminars that would last a day, a week or a year (perhaps during vacation)? Some initiatives have already been taken. Jean-Pierre Chevenement and Roland Carraz have agreed to examine this question in depth with me.

I also wonder if we have used all the resources offered by the training organizations of large companies. I am referring to EDF [French Electric Company], the SNCF [French National Railroads], the RATP [Independent Parisian Transport System], to certain major occupational sectors, etc. At present these firms organize in-service training programs for the purpose of hiring people that they recruit. Why not separate training and hiring? I would think that firms closely linked with EDF would be interested in young people who have been through some of these training centers. It has been said that I wanted "to set a number." In terms of training, employment in the public interest and creating jobs if possible, setting a number means responding to an emergency. And I never said that a desire for results should be incompatible with a concern for doing better. I also intend to draw up a simple and clear summary on the change in employment and training in each department and region.

LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE: What to you seems exemplary in the solution found for Citroen, your first test as minister?

Michel Delebarre: There is neither a lesson nor an example. But in this case it seems to me that there are four essential items which do not concern merely Citroen or the automobile industry.

The first is the importance of communication between labor and management. In the joint production committees employers and employees must talk about the industrial future and their firm. This is called for by the Auroux laws. Secondly, the legal link (in other words, the work contract) between the firm in question and the staff being trained/oriented must be maintained. This is an important item in the solution. Thirdly, firms that are modernizing must make a sizable effort to conduct internal training. Lastly--and this also stems from a normal application of the Auroux laws--in the sectors that are changing significantly, employers and union leaders must agree to talk about the organization of work. At Citroen, I was not able to take into account the results of a discussion on work time because it didn't happen.

LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE: What precisely is left of using a reduced workweek as an anti-unemployment weapon?

Michel Delebarre: There is no universal doctrine that can be implemented in 2 months. There must be a lot of flexibility.

LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE: How do you plan to reactivate contractual policy, taking into account economic constraints, particularly what affects salaries and purchasing power?

Michel Delebarre: Here again it is not up to the government to dictate the rules of behavior for the employers or unions. But aside from the attention that I get as minister of labor, employment and occupational training, I intend to personally go out into the field in order to visit the firms that succeed and to see where labor and management are talking to each other. I am convinced that social dialogue is an essential item in a firm's productivity. And I believe in its value as an example.

9720  
CSO:3519/006

## UNCERTAINTIES OF GOVERNMENT'S BUDGET PLAN

Government Employees, Debt Servicing

Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French 24 Sep 84 pp 58-59

[Article by Jean-Claude Hazera: "The Art of Distributing the Savings"]

[Text] Will state expenditures in 1985 stay within the limits of Pierre Bérégovoy's budget? The biggest hopes for savings are concentrated in areas that are often difficult to evaluate.

The most difficult exercise that could be inflicted on a minister of finance who has just barely finished the difficult task of designing his budget would be to read to him the optimistic statements that his predecessors made 1 or 2 years earlier: "an effort at exceptional savings," "limiting the deficit," etc. State expenditures this year were to increase less quickly (6.3 percent) than production (7 percent). It is not very likely that this goal is about to be reached judging by the rush to implement increases which should allow the 1985 budget to be balanced.

In 1985 it would be even better to meet the goal (expenditures increasing 5.9 percent while production increases 7.5 percent) because there are two objectives: lowering income taxes and controlling a deficit which, at 3 percent of production, does not seem so virtuous in comparison to the imbalances that are being reduced in some countries such as Germany.

The propensity of public expenditures to vary during the year can be explained by an art for distributing fewer savings to definite expenditures than to hypothetical expenditures.

For 1985 some savings that were taken for granted in the end escaped the ax. Some cultural priorities that involve large-scale construction, such as the Grand Louvre, the Orsay Museum or the Bastille Opera, will remain even though no one knows how many billions they are worth. On the other hand, the La Villette Museum of Science and Technology will create 510 jobs. The cries of professional building and public works organizations can make an illusion out of the state's savings. The budget of the ministry of transportation is

increasing only 3.9 percent but at the same time the budget for housing assistance is increasing 11.6 percent and will reach the tidy sum of 43 billion francs (more than 4 percent of all state expenditures). This does not include the "tax expenditure" of encouraging investment in rental property and renovation. Firms that work for the army are less annoyed than planned. Although operating expenses are increasing only 3.97 percent, capital expenditures accompanying the GDP will increase 7.65 percent.

There remains the most sensitive savings, the one which by itself sets a mood and affects a good one-third of state expenditures--salaries of the civil service. The implementation of the budget will depend more on the manner in which Jean Le Garrec spends his allotted increases than on eliminating jobs, of which fewer than originally thought will be eliminated. Although jobs have been created in some ministries such as National Education (2,300 jobs), there were not 5,454 jobs but closer to 9,000 that had to be eliminated elsewhere.

The uncertain expenditure "par excellence" is the estimation of debt servicing which leaves room for fantasy although it is an increasingly important category--over 8 percent of expenditures. Compared to last year's figure (70 billion), this year's figure (84 billion) gives the impression that all precautions have been taken. But it is already known that the actual amount of the debt this year will really be 80 rather than 70 billion. From year to year debt servicing increases as the total debt grows and it will be almost 800 billion at the end of the year. This cumulative phenomenon, whereby deficits feed on themselves, is one of the reasons often mentioned by Pierre Beregovoy, the minister of economy and finance, for making debt reduction the highest priority.

The budget category "debt servicing" includes only the interest paid by the state, so it is very sensitive to the assumptions made about the changes in rates. The medium and long-term fixed rate debt accounts for only about one-third of the total. To reach the figure of 84 billion, a colleague of the minister stated that it was assumed that the rates would be "on average 8.5 percent on the money market, 9 percent on Treasury bonds and 11.5 percent on state bonds during 1985." Clearly, rates should decline an average of 2 points like inflation. The conditions of the state loan initiated this week show that the Ministry of Finance has definitely decided that rates should be going down. The new group on the Rue de Rivoli has also planned to apply to state finances the methods that enabled them to find several billion in cash in the Social Security accounts.

To contain these expenditures on paper the state was also counting on the wisdom and frugality of others: Social Security, public firms, local communities. Limiting social expenditures is part of the famous planned reduction in obligatory withholding but it also partly explains the expected moderation in the large category where a little of everything is lumped--"operations." This category has 324 billion, about one-third of state expenditures, and is supposed to increase only 2.84 percent. State assistance to social systems, which increased 33 percent in 1982 and 23 percent in 1983 has been asked to stop at 6.1 percent in 1985, which will still mean 88.6 billion francs.

Similarly, the proposed budget is basing a lot of hopes on a moderation of public sector deficits, hopes that are not always confirmed by the predictions and statements of the heads of these firms. The "need for financing" of the "large national firms," which includes both deficits and the need for borrowing in order to invest, is assumed to go from 1.5 percent of the GDP in 1983 to 1.1 percent this year and 0.8 percent next year. Although the state is planning to increase its capital subsidies to firms in the competitive public sector (14.7 billion) nothing has been planned for EDF [French Electric Company], GDF [French Gas Company], CDF [French Coal Board], or the SNCF [French National Railroads] or the RATP [Parisian Independent Transport System]. "Truth in public rates" still has some good days ahead of it in 1985.

#### Government's 'Official Silence' Questioned

Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French 24 Sep 84 p 61

[Editorial by Jacques Plassard, chief executive officer of Rexeco: "In Favor of Budgetary Clarity"]

[Text] In mid-September the public begins to talk about the budget policy. That is normal in a democratic nation. What is not normal is that citizens have no information on how the budget was carried out in 1984. The "Official Gazette" of 30 June gave the Treasury's state as of last 31 December. Six months to provide the annual statement! The state does not allow businesses to wait 6 months before announcing their figures. But don't the state and its civil servants set themselves up as examples? Now here we are 8 months behind.

Don't tell us that it is impossible to do better. Through publications printed in Washington and available in Paris, we know how the American federal budget was implemented at the end of last July. We will probably have the statements for August in a few days. The lack of information on the implementation of the budget for citizens and those they have elected is a breaking of the rules of democracy. Unable to discuss actual management, the opposition is reduced to invective. Citizens obviously have no confidence in a state that does not say what is going on. Or perhaps it does not know itself, which means deplorable management, or perhaps it is hiding what it knows, and thereby violates democratic principles and justifies the suspicion that what it is doing is literally "unspeakable." There is worse. Senior civil servants without political experience believe it is preferable not to have the people participate in state management because the people are incapable of understanding and their representatives are quick to embrace demagogic. In fact, ignorance results in misunderstanding and justifies demagogic.

If, as it is whispered, the implementation of the 1984 budget shows tax shortfalls and therefore a deficit significantly higher than the one forecast, approaching 4 percent of the GDP, then the increase in telephone rates and taxes on gasoline is explainable. But these taxes were levied with no understanding as to why. Revolution is the daughter of ignorance and it obviously upsets management.

Firms need forecast management. But how can forecasts be made when changes that, in order of magnitude, represent one-quarter of the GNP are ignored? The French economy and its businesses are condemned to advancing in the fog.

The Parliament--House and Senate--must intervene and demand that public accounts be made known. The first requirement must be to rapidly publish Treasury accounts, for example by reducing the delay by 2 months every year so that in 3 years it will be normal. The second requirement would be to ask the Deposit Bank, which has members of Parliament on its board, to publish a straightforward monthly statement that shows its relations with the public treasury, the social funds, the communities and the departments.

These are fundamental institutional reforms that would satisfy both the principle of democracy and the needs of good management. Here is an area where both the opposition and the majority could agree and Laurent Fabius and Pierre Bérégovoy could be proud to accomplish this in conjunction with the two finance committees. This would be a special occasion to put into practice the slogan of "getting together and modernizing" and to give it a concrete context.

9720  
CSO:3519/020

## EXPORTS UP 20 PERCENT IN FIRST 6 MONTHS OF 1984

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 18 Sep 84 p 7

[Article: "Exports Up 20 Percent in First Six Months--Raw Materials and Various Industrial Products"]

[Excerpts] "There was a marked increase in the current drachma and dollar value of exports in June 1984 compared with the same month in 1983," according to figures from the Panhellenic Exporters Association's KEEM [Exports Research and Studies Center]. In the 6 months January-June 1984, the value of exports showed a "significant increase" compared with the same period last year. KEEM points out, however, that in the first half of 1983, the basis of comparison for the first half of this year, exports were very low.

Developments in industrial exports are clearly more favorable than those in agricultural exports. Furthermore, a significant improvement was noted in exports to all major regions of the world except the Middle East, North Africa and "other developing countries."

The KEEM announcement is as follows:

During the month of June 1984, exports reached \$359 million. That is an increase of 14.3 percent compared with June 1983. However, the increase is smaller--up 10.2 percent--if petroleum products are not included.

During the 6-month period January-June 1984, exports amounted to \$2,483,000,000. This represents a significant increase of 23.1 percent compared with the corresponding 6 months of last year. This increase is almost unchanged--up 22.3 percent--even if petroleum products are not included. If the recovery in exports continues at the same rate during the rest of this year, then they are expected to reach a level of around \$5 billion. For comparison, exports in 1983 amounted to \$4.5 billion, in 1982 and 1981 to \$4.3 billion and in 1980 to \$5.2 billion (in current dollars).

Two main points stand out for this half of the year. The first is the clear recovery in export activity in almost all broad product categories and in all geographic regions except the Middle East and North Africa. The second point is the satisfactory recovery in industrial exports for the first time in 4 years.

Exports increased in January-June 1984 in all Standard International Trade Classification product categories except for "machines and material for transport" (category 7), where exports dropped slightly (down 7 percent). The increase was particularly strong in exports of "raw materials" (category 2: up 47 percent), "miscellaneous industrial products" (category 8: up 30 percent), and "industrial products classified by raw material" (category 6: up 29 percent). There was also a spectacular increase in exports of "goods and exchanges not classified by category" (category 9: up 351 percent). This is a very small class, however, and the increase consists mostly of exports of weapons and ammunition to Portugal in May 1984. The total of industrial exports rose by 24 percent, and agricultural exports were up 17 percent.

Compared with the same period in 1983, in the first half of 1984 there was a significant increase in exports to all major geographical regions. One exception was exports to "other developing countries," which are of limited importance and which dropped slightly, down 8 percent. There were also slight decreases in exports to the Middle East and North Africa (down 3 percent). On the other hand, exports to North America jumped a spectacular 96 percent. There was also a significant increase of 24 percent in exports to the EEC. It should also be noted that exports to "other OECD countries," which are not, however, very significant, more than doubled, up 124 percent. Of particular note were the increases to Turkey (up 549 percent) and Japan (up 221 percent). The increase in exports to EFTA was also especially great (up 63 percent), though these too are of limited importance. Here, exports to Portugal were 12 times higher, and those to Sweden were up by 112 percent. Total exports to OECD countries increased by 36 percent, and there was also a noticeable increase in exports to socialist countries. This is due primarily to the significant increase in exports to CEMA countries.

12593  
CSO: 3521/363

**SOVIET ORDERS PROVIDE WORK FOR SHIPYARD**

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 20 Aug 84 p 9

[Text] The Viana do Castelo shipyards have just delivered to the Soviet ship chandler Sudoinport the first of a series of four river-sea freight and bulk-carrying ships, the overall cost of which amounts to about \$38 million (5.7 million contos).

This ship, named the "Sormovsky 3051" has an overall length of about 120 meters, weighs 3,125 tons, and has a cargo capacity of 4,700 cubic meters and a speed of 10.5 knots.

During the ceremony of signing the delivery registers, the Soviet officials emphasized the "quality of construction," which "meets all the rules of Soviet registration and all international conventions."

**Important Order**

Contacted by the DIARIO DE NOTICIAS, the chairman of the board of the Viana do Castelo shipyards emphasized the "importance of this order for the company because it has absorbed a large part of its manpower. The ships in this order follow a design prepared by us which was found to be satisfactory," continued Dr Luis Lacerda. "Since it is a series, it has made it possible to achieve very beneficial economic results."

According to Dr Luis Lacerda, although the last ship in this series will not be delivered until next year, the Viana shipyards are already "negotiating another series of ships of different concept which we hope will be as successful as those we are now delivering. They will be ships intended for the transportation of a large variety of cargoes, from automobiles to common bulk cargo," explained our source. "We are working at full capacity; we are qualified to build ships such as these and, therefore, we feel at ease."

The orders from the Soviet Union have guaranteed the full employment of the approximately 2,000 workers in the Viana do Castelo shipyards who, according to Luis Lacerda, have work guaranteed "until the end of 1985." In addition to these orders from the USSR, the Viana do Castelo shipyards are building two ships to transport chemical products for Brazil, at the same time that it has handled repairs that are requested.

"We have to negotiate other orders," Dr Luis Lacerda told us. "It would be excellent if the Portuguese merchant marine would grace us with its appearance, since it has not been a market for national shipyards for 10 years. In the past decade, we built only two ships for the national fleet, which is very little. And it is a little difficult to live only on exports at a time of crisis."

8711  
CSO: 3542/124

**DECREASE NOTED IN 1983 REAL WAGES**

Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 24 Aug 84 p 3

[Text] According to a summary of the report of the Bank of Portugal to which the Portuguese News Agency (ANOP) has had access, real wages showed a decline of over 5 percent in 1983.

This wage development resulted in another decrease in the percentage of the national income represented by salaries, dropping to 53.5 percent of that income, which in turn showed a decrease in the order of 1 percent in real terms. On the other hand, the large increase of indirect taxation (net of subsidies) together with the greater devaluation of the escudo caused inflation to accelerate considerably in the second half of 1983. Thus, prices to the consumer increased 33.9 percent during the year and 25.5 percent in average terms.

The document states also that as a reflection of the decline or stagnation of production in all sectors, the volume of employment dropped appreciably in 1983, with the unemployment figure reaching 10.8 percent in the third quarter.

The most prominent aspect of the evolution of the Portuguese economy in 1983 consisted in the "notable reduction of the foreign trade deficit," according to the summary of the Bank of Portugal report.

The document, the full text of which is scheduled to be published in a few days, states that as a result of the stabilization policy adopted, the deficit in the Balance of Current Transactions (BCT) was reduced in the past year to \$1.686 billion, half the figure for 1982. Thus, the BTC deficit share in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) went from 13.4 percent in 1982 to 7.4 percent in 1983.

The improvement of the BCT was "entirely due to the favorable development of the movements of goods, services and profits since there was a deterioration of 1.7 percent in the terms of exchange and a drop in the contribution made by the remittances of emigrants."

The balance of trade and the balance of services and income profits improved considerably, reducing their respective deficits to \$3.1 billion and

\$700 million, but the unilateral transfers basically comprised of the remittances of the emigrants fell 20.5 percent compared to the previous year, reaching the sum of \$2.1 billion.

About three-quarters of the reduction in the trade deficit was due to the curtailment of imports, while exports, despite their large increase, accounted for only one-quarter of that improvement.

As a highly positive factor, the gain of market quotas for Portuguese exports in the industrialized countries as a whole is estimated at more than 12 percent, while the progressive diversification of Portuguese exports was accentuated, with mineral products, machinery, and metal products gaining ground in the composition of those exports to the detriment of the traditional products.

The report states that the limits established in the agreement with the IMF were met "with ease."

In the meantime, it emphasizes that the counterpart of the results obtained in 1983 regarding the BCT and the deficit in the public sector was a drop in the level of economic activity, the appreciable reduction of employment and available real income and the acceleration of inflation.

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CSO: 3542/124

## SPANISH INTEGRATION INTO EEC THREATENS COUNTRY'S ACCESS

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 5 Sep 84 p 6

[Editorial article: "Moran's Leg"]

[Text] Ernani Lopes' irritated unhappiness over the very slow pace of negotiations for the integration of Portugal in the EEC is reasonable and understandable. The finance minister's frustration is justified for two reasons: not only have pleasant political expectations been nurtured regarding dates, but the whole Portuguese economic orientation is based on the assumption of the forthcoming entry of our country into the Community. Thus, the government is placed in a disconcerting dilemma: if negotiations are not concluded within a few weeks and if the entry does not occur in the beginning of 1986, the process loses its political significance and the development of our economy runs the risk of becoming blocked.

Because in the last analysis, this is an action depending on political decisions, especially by the most powerful members of the Ten. Portuguese authorities may perhaps still have reasons to trust in the success of their efforts. Viewed from a strictly economic perspective, it was predictable from the beginning that the eventual expansion of the Community to include the Iberian countries would bring about the current desideratum. Furthermore, former Finance Minister Vitor Constancio admitted it in 1977--it should be recalled once again--during a conference with Francois Mitterrand before his election as president of France. The principal obstacle is the competitive aggressiveness of Spanish agriculture. The "globalization" thesis, a barrier that was erected at first, was quietly withdrawn; but the progress of the negotiations is hampered by this final point with the same objective.

Etienne Davignon, vice president of the EEC Commission believes that it is important now to avoid the errors of the past. And he declares that the Spanish position in the field of agriculture "affects the pillars of the Community." It is true. However, he does not say that in the affluent Green Europe the surpluses of the agricultural "banquet" are fed to livestock or thrown in the garbage. And that this policy alone--"the removal from the market" of the surplus fruits and vegetables--has cost the depleted Community budget the enormous sum of 35 billion escudos in the 1982-83 season. Some members of the Community seek in this way to preserve the excellent standard of living of their farmers. A disgraceful practice? There are

many even in Community circles who agree with Mrs Thatcher, who for years has fought against this "stupid system" of the EEC, which consists in paying guaranteed minimum prices to the farmer to produce more and more, whether it is necessary or not.

Spanish agriculture appears to be a dangerous competitor of the neighboring Community countries' agriculture. That explains the fear that prevails in Community circles regarding the possibility of the indigestion of the Common Market being aggravated in the medium term by the vegetables and fruits of Spain. Such is not the case of Portugal. The only thing is that, despite the fact that Ernani Lopes maintains that in "this final phase of the negotiations, it is necessary to resolutely respect the particular merits of the Portuguese case," the Ten naturally fear the consequences of saying "yes" to our country and "no" to Spain.

The "optimism of Fontainebleau" seems to be giving way at this end of summer to a profound pessimism. It should not be surprising that Portuguese officials are beginning to show some nervousness. In a calmer vein, the foreign minister of Spain, Fernando Moran, believes "nothing disastrous" has occurred now at the Brussels meeting. "The only painful thing is my leg" (which he had broke a few days before), he commented with sarcasm. The gambles made by the two countries with regard to entry into the EEC are different. So are the positions of the two countries. If the Ten persist in wanting to be only a "market of fruits and vegetables"--giving an extremely restricted and poor image of the European idea--Portugal and Mario Soares will certainly lose much more than Spain and Felipe Gonzalez.

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## EDF BALANCED BUDGET PLANS WORRY UNIONS

Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French 10 Sep 84 p 65

[Article by Jean-Michel Caroit: "Master Plan Contract"]

[Text] EdF will soon sign its Master Plan Contract. With one priority: get out of the red.

Cross my heart: 1984 will be the year of recovery for Electricite de France [French Electric Company]. The deficit (5.7 billion francs in 1983) should be noticeably reduced. And the national enterprise presided over by Marcel Boiteux will finally sign its planning contract. At the very latest at the Board of Directors' meeting on 27 September.

The first priority is a return to financial equilibrium: EdF has accumulated a deficit of nearly 20 billion francs in four years, and at the end of this year its total indebtedness will reach 120 billion francs. Without reducing personnel but by slowing down its investment program, at best the result should be a balanced budget at the end of the year. At worst, the deficit should be 2 billion, while revenue will go from 101.4 billion in 1983 to more than 120 billion.

Merits. Self-financing should cover 48 percent of the investments (40 billion this year) compared to only 38 percent last year. The fact remains that the recourse to borrowing continues to involve considerable sums of money, 27 billion (6.5 of which are to repay former loans). "Our signature remains excellent," they are happy to say at EdF following the recent floating of a \$500 million loan which will redistribute part of the debt making conditions of repayment more favorable.

The new Energy Secretary, Martin Malvy, does not hide the fact that he is in a hurry. Since the Left came into power, it has been singing the praises of "Master Plant contracts." These mutually agreed-upon contracts define the degree of freedom allowed the management of national companies.

Up to now, none of the large companies in the energy sector has signed a planning contract. Jean Aurous, energy secretary at that time, announced the upcoming signature several times. But changes in coal mining policy and the agreement signed last March between EdF and the French National Coal


Board raised many new questions. The new version defines a principal objective: the EdF promises to lower its unit cost by an average of 3 percent in constant francs from 1984 to 1988. "But," top management emphasizes, "there should be no confusion between a lowering of the average cost price of a kilowatt-hour and a lowering of rates in general. EdF cannot promise to reduce its prices by 3 percent at once and for everyone." The reduction, therefore, will be gradual and probably greater at the end of the period. The volume of productivity gain which the company could achieve depends on various parameters, some of which the company could achieve depends on various parameters, some of which are beyond its control: changes in the rate of exchange for the dollar and interest rates, the "availability" of nuclear power plants (excellent at the moment) and increases in consumption.

It is true that sales of electricity are developing at an encouraging pace both in industry and with our European neighbors. In 1984, the first seven months' accumulated consumption has increased by 7.2 percent compared to the corresponding period last year. In six months exports have reached the level for the whole of 1983 (more than 13 billion kilowatt-hours). Great Britain, Germany, Switzerland, Italy and Belgium have signed new contracts.

Probably more for a question of procedure than of substance, the planning contract has not been well received by the unions. "In contradiction to the law of democratization of the public sector, this document has not been discussed with workers' representatives," regrets Claude Bonnet, an official of the Energy Federation. The CGT [General Federation of Labor], Krasucki's union headquarters, wants him to reaffirm the promise--made by the Administration and never kept--that the risks of change would be assumed by the State. "EdF has had to go further and further into debt on the foreign market at the bidding of successive governments, while most of its revenue is in French francs," Bonnet pointed out. The CGT also insists that EdF order two new nuclear units in 1985, while the company management believes that one would be ample. The decision, which should be announced very soon by the Adminstration, is anxiously awaited by Framatome [nuclear power company] and the other purchasers of Creusot-Loire.

[see graph, next page]

## French Kilowatts Are Selling Well



Net imports or exports in billions of kilowatt-hours

12687  
CSO: 3519/492

ENERGY

PORUGAL

BRIEFS

**FIRST QUARTER OIL IMPORTS**--According to data disclosed by the Portuguese Foreign Trade Institute, Saudia Arabia was the primary supplier of crude oil to Portugal during the first quarter of 1984, at 14.4 million contos, followed by Iraq and Nigeria, at 9.5 and 8.4 million contos, respectively. [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 8 Sep 84 p 5] 9805

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**DATE FILMED**

6 Nov 1984